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Abstract
Collective labels are widespread in food markets, either separated or nested with
private brands; the latter known as nested names. We propose a model to explain the
rationale of nested names, with collective labels being effective in reaching unaware
consumers while individual brands help firms to reach aware consumers. We also
incorporate the decision-making within the group of producers joining collective labels,
taking into account their heterogeneity in providing quality. We show that nested
names emerge when consumers become more aware of information on the label’s quality
and when producers become more heterogeneous. Welfare may decrease, however,
when the group switches to nested names, because nested names may lead to lower
quality incentives for the majority producers. The results also provide insights into the
historical and recent trends in food industries, such as within-label differentiation and
label fragmentation, and their welfare implications.
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1 Introduction
Agricultural producers and food firms can build their own brands, but they can also join
collective labels, such as the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and Product of Geo-
graphical Indication (PGI) labels in the European geographical indication system that was
formally established in 1992 at the EU level (EU Reg. 2081/1992). The coexistence and
the simultaneous use of private brands and collective labels is also common in agricultural
and food markets. Such a labeling strategy, known as ‘nested names’, has received attention
in recent empirical studies (see, e.g., Costanigro et al., 2010). In this article, we introduce
an original model to investigate the choice of labeling strategies when firms can use both
individual brands and collective labels.
One of the objectives of promoting collective labels is to ensure the quality of regional
products (see, e.g., article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012). Besides Europe, collective
labels are given public recognition and support at regional and national government level
in many countries. In the USA, for instance, American Viticultural Areas (AVA) have been
in use since 1978. New Zealand has decided to bring into force the so-called ‘GI Act’ to
acknowledge and register Geographical Indications (GIs) produced domestically and abroad.
In British Columbia, wineries may join Vintners Quality Assurance (VQA) standards. More
recently, China’s emerging Ningxia wine region has announced plans for its first winery
classification based on a Bordeaux-like system (Wu, 2016). Besides wine, one could also
mention Colombian coffee, Jaffa oranges from Israel, Anji and Longjin tea from China, and
many other examples throughout the world.
The EU has long been seeking recognition for these collective labels, while other countries
have preferred to rely on private brands and have maintained a more lenient approach to-
wards the possible ‘improper’ use of foreign collective names by domestic firms. A great deal
of controversy in recent trade negotiations between the EU and Canada on the one side (Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) and the USA on the other side (Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership) has surrounded GIs (see, e.g., Breteau and Audureau,
2016). As the use of collective labels is spreading throughout many countries and evolving
towards more nested names and proliferation, some questions emerge naturally. What are
the firm’s best labeling strategies: to use collective labels or nested names? How is product
quality chosen under different labeling schemes? Are firms’ labeling strategies good or bad
for economic welfare? Do they deserve preferential treatment – if not explicit subsidization
– by governments and policy-makers?
The effects of collective schemes such as GIs have been studied quite extensively. The
empirical evidence suggests that private brands and collective labels, used separately or
jointly, may have disparate impacts on consumers’ quality perception.1 Despite the large
number of empirical studies on the simultaneous use of different labels for food products,
1For example, Bonnet and Simioni (2001) and Hassan and Monier-Dilhan (2006) show that consumers
are willing to pay a price premium for brand names. Deselnicu et al. (2013) find that collective labels, such
as PDOs, can add value to food products. Loureiro and McCluskey (2006) show that for beef meat the PGI
label is mostly valued by consumers for cuts of average quality. Similar evidence has been found in the US
wine market (Costanigro et al., 2007). Costanigro et al. (2010) argue that individual brands and collective
labels can be complementary: the evidence in the wine sector shows that collective (or aggregate) names
add price premia to expensive wines using firm-specific names.
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on the theoretical side there are only a few studies that explicitly take into consideration
this coexistence. Most of the models in this vein assume that labels convey full information
or can perfectly inform consumers at some cost (see, e.g., Crespi and Marette, 2001 and
Moschini et al., 2008 among others). Zago and Pick (2004) for instance, consider the market
segmentation effect of the label, showing that its welfare effects are positive when the high-
quality segment remains sufficiently competitive. Labels have also a differentiation effect,
transforming a homogeneous market into a differentiated one – with a possible detrimental
effect for some consumers – thus making the labeling policy less appealing than a mininum
quality standard (Baltzer, 2011).
An exceptional case is that of Bonroy and Constantatos (2008), who consider the situ-
ation of an ‘imperfect’ label, that is, when the labeling information is not perceived by all
consumers. They identify two types of labels: an ‘easy-to-grasp’ label that can improve the
information for unsophisticated consumers, and a ‘sophisticated’ label that provides detailed
information but is totally ignored by unsophisticated consumers. They derive the welfare
impact of these labels under a two-quality duopoly structure. However, in their analysis they
do not investigate the coexistence of different labels, nor do they consider the endogenous
quality choices under different labeling patterns.
Another strand of literature studies the reputation effects of brands or labels for credence
goods. While most work investigates individual and collective (or regional) reputations inde-
pendently (see, e.g., Tadelis, 1999, Mailath and Samuelson, 2001, and Shapiro, 1983 for firm
individual reputations; Tirole, 1996, Winfree and McCluskey, 2005, and Fishman et al., 2014
for collective or regional reputations), very few works consider the coexistence of different
labels. Costanigro et al. (2012) investigate the quality incentives of firms choosing nested
names. They devise a model of a differential game that combines Shapiro’s (1983) model
of private reputation and Winfree and McCluskey’s (2005) model of collective reputation.
Using simulations, they find evidence consistent with Costanigro et al. (2010), that is, pri-
vate reputations become more valuable than collective ones the more expensive the product
is. However, the model mainly focuses on the dual reputation effect of the nested names,
without investigating the endogenous formation of other labeling schemes, for example, the
individual brand and collective label emerging separately. Moreover, they do not provide the
implications of different labeling schemes in relation to quality provision and social welfare.
In this paper, we develop an original model to analyze the labeling strategies of producers
within a region, taking into account their different impacts on consumers’ perception about
product quality and the effects on producers’ quality investment incentives. Our analysis
builds on the evidence of Costanigro et al. (2010; 2012), but adds also to the theoretical
literature on labeling. We can thus explain recent industry trends. As is further illustrated
in Section 2, when producers sharing a common regional label have different quality poten-
tials, divergent interests concerning the quality rules within the collective label may emerge.
Differentiation within the label may follow, with some producers using nested names, while
others hold on to the collective label only.
These trends and controversies are difficult to reconcile with existing models of quality
labels. For example, most of the models in the labeling literature consider two types of
producers, but once the label is introduced it usually leads to a market segmentation between
high- and low-quality producers, where producers within each segment are homogeneous
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(Bonroy and Constantatos, 2015).2 Moreover, Costanigro et al. (2012) show results in which
nested names are associated with heterogeneity, leading to the conclusion that nested names
“are inherently prone to intra-regional controversies” (p. 262). Given our results, we would
argue for a reverse causality, that is, for the alternative testable hypothesis that nested names
may emerge when firms are heterogeneous.
Our first contribution is to capture the heterogeneity of consumers regarding the infor-
mation they have or that they can collect about the quality implied in the labeling schemes.
While some consumers are aware about the firm-specific brands, the general public tends to
be unaware about the brand information. Instead, they are more likely to be informed about
or by the collective label, which conveys information on the average quality in the region.
High-quality producers may therefore join a collective label that has negative spillovers for
them in order to access consumers who may be unaware of their individual brands. We
thus propose an economic rationale for a phenomenon usually explained in terms of product
differentiation involving heterogeneous consumers.
Our second contribution is to incorporate heterogeneity across producers within the group
that chooses the labeling strategies and the associated quality standards. We show how
choices of quality standards and labeling strategies can differ according to which type of
producers have more influence within a group and on the available outside options. We
thus explain the emergence of label differentiation, showing how an increase in the degree of
heterogeneity may lead to different labeling choices and hence name patterns, that is, from
collective labels to nested names or separated labels.
In the next section, we describe recent cases that illustrate the coexistence of different
labeling schemes and some controversies that emerge when groups decide on the quality
rules within the collective label. In Section 3, we introduce the model, highlighting the
information structure underlying the possible name patterns. In Section 4, we determine the
equilibrium name patterns that emerge and the associated welfare impact. In Section 5, we
discuss the robustness of our main results to alternative specifications of the model. In the
final section, we discuss the policy implications, and conclude.
2 Industry trends
The coexistence of private brands and collective labels is common in the wine industry,
where well-known firms typically use private brands together with regional brands, while
other firms benefit mostly, if not only, from the PDO. This is the case, for instance, in
Valpolicella, the second most important region for red wine production in Italy. Here, some
of the major wine producers with established brand names have grouped into the ‘Famiglie
dell’Amarone d’Arte’. Historically, they have been one of a number of firms to heavily invest
in the Amarone production technology and have established a worldwide reputation for their
wines. These firms recently argued vehemently against the Consorzio per la tutela dei vini
Valpolicella, the body managing the PDO and to which all its wine producers belong, as a
2In the reputation literature, on the other hand, the high-quality producers establish a collective label
to separate from low-quality firms, and therefore there is no differentiation within the collective label group
(see, e.g., Fishman et al., 2014).
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significant part of Amarone production is taking place in valley vineyards.3
This valley production, though, is in contrast to the long established PDO rules that
have allowed Amarone to be produced mainly in the ‘classical’, that is, traditional, hilly
areas. The Consorzio di Tutela has recently suggested amending its own rules to explicitly
allow for the production of Amarone in plain vineyards as well (dell’Orefice, 2013). However,
different firms, notably those grouped into the Famiglie dell’Amarone d’Arte, were against
such changes, arguing that Amarone production should remain confined to the hilly areas
where quality is higher (Guerrini, 2013a).4 Some of these firms have also threatened to
leave the PDO (Guerrini, 2013b) and to use their separate names only.5 In May 2013, the
general assembly of producers, following a suggestion by the Board of Directors, confirmed
in a majority vote the possibility of producing Amarone in the valley areas. The decision
was probably not a surprise, given that, “The voting system, which is based on grapes’
production quota, has given an advantage to the bigger producers who were in favor of the
extension” (Costanzo, 2013).
Similar to the Valpolicella case is the situation that has emerged in Oltrepo` Pavese,
where some of the major and well-known producers have recently left the official Consorzio
di Tutela. Dissatisfied with the quality policies and its attempts to allow greater yields (thus
lowering quality), they accuse the Consorzio of being more concerned with the interests of
wine-bottlers than wine-makers because of the distribution of voting rights: “Many wine
producers do not feel represented by Consorzio, because its bylaws link production levels
to voting rights. With this rule, a single firm, Terra d’Oltrepo` controls the votes in the
assembly and hence the activities of Consorzio, since it produces over 50% of the wine in
the area” (Morra, 2015: 10). And, “given that this firm produces bulk wine to be sold to
wine-bottlers, it is these latter’s interests that really count” (Bertolli, 2015).
There are also other instances in which groups in the past have split, often when some
producers have left the original PDO controlled by so-called ‘too conservative’ or lower-
quality firms. Probably the most famous is the case of Tuscany, where in the last decades the
Chianti PDO has expanded, differentiated within (with the original sub-zone distinguishing
it as ‘Chianti Classico’) and even witnessed the exit of some innovative producers, which
have left the Chianti PDO (and their required Sangiovese, plus local varieties blend) to
experiment blending with other international grapes, that is, Cabernet or Merlot.6 A more
3Firms in Valpolicella produce different types of red wine, but in the last decades, Amarone – the strongest
and most full-bodied variety – has been fetching prices well above those for other red wines coming from the
same area and grapes. Historically, Amarone was produced mostly in hilly areas, considered to be better
suited for the higher-quality grapes. Over the years, however, because of an increasing demand, Amarone
wine production has been quietly but steadily extended to other production areas as well, in particular to
the plain valleys, where yields are higher but quality is purportedly lower.
4S. Boscaini, owner of Masi, explained that, “I’m not convinced that Valpolicella should be made outside
the hills. The Classico region is historically one of small growers, but the rest is 90% co-ops, and they try to
minimise the differences between the original area and the additional area. I’m not saying that they can’t
make great wine. But [increasing the size of the AOC] has been a disaster for Valpolicella, driving it down
in quality” (Rand, 2013 : 38).
5However, by leaving the PDO they could not use ‘Amarone della Valpolicella’, which is a world-recognized
collective label.
6These instances of separating producers have led to the production of the so called ‘Super-Tuscan’ wines,
that is wines using international grapes (not allowed by the Chianti regulation). These could initially be
produced only outside the PDO rules as ‘table wines’, thus using only the producers’ individual brands.
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recent case is in the Rioja region, where one of the most well-known producers left the PDO,
with others threatening to follow suit, due to their dissatisfaction with the PDO’s labeling
rules (Mount, 2016).
We believe the Valpolicella and these other cases are emblematic of the situations we
represent with our model. Many producers share a collective label which is recognized by
consumers and the market, but they are of different quality potentials. Possible opportuni-
ties (or threats) require changes in the (quality) rules adopted by the group, but different
producers may have divergent interests and so hold different positions on the matter. Some
may be concerned that the suggested changes may lower the quality of the product (or its
perception by consumers). To decide on the rule to adopt at the group’s level, a collective
decision-making mechanism is used, for example, the majority rule. Producers not satisfied
with the adopted decision may consider distinguishing themselves within the collective brand
(by using nested individual brands, as seen in Valpolicella) or leaving the group altogether
with separate names (still only a threat in this case, while a reality in other regions such as
Chianti and Oltrepo`).
3 The model
To analyze the economics of nested names, we develop a model rich enough to enable the anal-
ysis of endogenous quality choices and labeling strategies. Nevertheless, the setting should be
simple enough to reveal the basic rationale and effects behind these strategies, including the
information effect on consumers’ perception over quality, and the potential spillovers among
producers with heterogeneous qualities. For this purpose, we start with a simple model
with fixed-quantity monopolistic producers facing consumers with homogeneous tastes over
quality. We thus abstract from the traditional motive of product differentiation in attracting
consumers with heterogeneous tastes and focus on the strategic motive of producers to use
different labels to balance the conflicting interests within a group. In Section 5 we show
that such a motive still exists in a more generalized setting, taking into account consumers’
heterogeneous tastes, producers’ competition, and the possibility of label signaling.
3.1 Basic setting
Consider an economy with a unit mass of risk neutral consumers, who face a unit mass of
producers of a region. Each consumer purchases one unit of the product. The utility function
is U(s, p) = s− p if the consumer purchases, and U(s, p) = 0 otherwise, where s denotes the
quality of the product and p its price.
Each producer provides at most one unit of product. Producers are heterogeneous in
quality provision. We assume that there are two types of producers (denoted by H and L).
A proportion β of producers (type H) can intrinsically provide high quality δ at zero cost.
The other proportion (1− β) of producers is of type L and can only provide quality s, with
s ∈ [s0, δ), where s0 is the lowest quality in the market, corresponding to the minimum
quality standard level. The production cost is Φ(s), where Φ′ > 0,Φ
′′
> 0. We assume
Φ(s0) = Φ
′(s0) = 0 and Φ′(δ) is high enough (Φ′(δ) > 1 in our setting) so that the L type
Eventually, the exiting producers were allowed to start a brand-new PDO, Bolgheri.
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producers have no incentive to reach the quality level of the H type, although they would
set a standard higher than s0 if the quality were known to consumers. To this end, δ reflects
the degree of heterogeneity of these two types of producers in their ability to provide quality.
The higher the δ, the more likely it is that the quality of the L type differs from that of the H
type.7 With such a setting, the H type producers behave ‘mechanically’ and commit to the
high quality δ, whereas the L type producers behave opportunistically in choosing quality,
affecting the overall quality level in the market.8
The assumption that the H producers can achieve high quality without unnecessary cost
is a simplification of our model, but it is consistent with the geographical nature of many
regional products, where some producers enjoy appropriate weather and soil conditions as
compared to those located in other parts of the same region. In France, for instance, which
“produces among the best wines in the world [..] and defines, classifies, and controls them
in more detail and has a longer history of this [..] than any other country” (Johnson and
Robinson, 2013: 46), the Burgundy classification system is the most sophisticated, with a
very long tradition of classifying vineyards to find the best quality climats, that is, plots of
land. Its soil quality is very heterogeneous and this, together with differences in altitude
and exposition, has always led to wines of “almost unpredictable quality” (Johnson and
Robinson, 2013: 48). However, over time traders have learned to distinguish the quality of
wines coming from different climats, and so the prices of the grapes have reflected the quality
potential of different plots. The best plots were those able to give quality wines consistently
across years with different weather conditions. In short, nowadays pundits continue to argue
for the Bungundy classification system, given that “the general validity of the hierarchy
is well supported by the market” (Lewin, 2010, our italics).9 In what follows, we fix the
quality of H producers but focus on the quality choices for the L type producers, which can
be stipulated in the quality standard of the collective label.
First best Under perfect information, all consumers are perfectly informed about the
product quality. The first-best quality level is defined as the quality of the L type producers
which maximizes total social welfare:
max
s
W (s) = βδ + (1− β)(s− Φ(s)).
7A more standard measure of the producers’ heterogeneity is the cost difference between L and H. In our
setting, the cost of producing quality δ for the two types is Φ(δ) and zero, respectively. The cost difference is
thus Φ(δ), which increases monotonically with δ. We thus use δ to measure the efficiency difference between
the two types.
8Such a setting is similar to the imitation approach in the reputation literature (see, for example, the
survey of Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008 and the seminal paper of Kreps and Wilson, 1982), with the good type
being a ‘commitment’ type and the bad type being a ‘strategic’ type who tries to imitate the good type in
order to benefit from a high price premium. However, instead of investigating the individual incentive in
building up reputations, we focus on the quality and labeling choices at a collective level, which have different
information effects compared to the individual strategy of reputation building. We also assume absence of
fraud (see, e.g., Di Fonzo and Russo, 2015, for an explicit treatment of this).
9An interesting case is the appellation of Montagny, on the Coˆte Chalonnaise, where producers between
1989 and 1991 voluntarily decided to reduce the number of Premiers Crus, that is, the second-top tier
climats. “There were plenty of private and public spats over which vineyards kept their status [..] but the
fact remains that the winemakers had seen over the preceeding decades that certain plots in Montagny made
unquestionably better wines than others” (Anson, 2016, our italics).
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The first-order condition gives the first-best quality level s∗:
1 = Φ′(s∗). (1)
This standard result implies that in the first-best quality level, the marginal valuation of the
low-quality type is equal to her marginal production cost.
A more realistic situation is that products have a credence good nature and their at-
tributes cannot be readily assessed by consumers. In the following subsection, we specify
the information structure of consumers.
3.2 Information, name patterns, and spillover effects
When quality is not observable, in the absence of any label or brand, consumers have no
information and expect only the lowest quality s0 for the product they purchase; a typical
lemon market outcome under information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). Labels and the as-
sociated names may convey some information on product quality to consumers. However,
consumers are often heterogeneous regarding the information they have (or can collect) about
the quality embodied in the product and how they can benefit from labeling schemes. In the
spirit of Costanigro et al. (2010) and Bonroy and Constantatos (2008), we consider two types
of consumers having different information about labels: ‘aware consumers’ accounting for
α (α ∈ (0, 1)) proportion of the unit population, and ‘unaware consumers’ with proportion
1 − α. Moreover, we consider two kinds of labeling strategies: individual brands (denoted
by ‘I’) and collective labels (‘C’). The principles (i.e., assumptions) of these strategies are
defined as follows:
Assumption 1 Individual brand (I), adopted by individual producers at cost f , can
inform the aware consumers about the true quality of the product but provides no information
to the unaware consumers.
This assumption captures the idea that individual brands developed to inform the knowledge-
able consumers that the products carrying such a brand are of higher quality are necessarily
costly. f captures the costs associated with the development of the brand, due to adver-
tising, promoting and other measures needed to inform consumers, enforce property rights,
and/or avoid counterfeiting. However, the individual brand can only inform an α proportion
of the population. Without the collective label, unaware consumers cannot recognize the
specificity of the brand and expect only the lowest quality of the market, that is, s0.
Assumption 2 Collective Labels (C), developed by the group of producers in a region at
no cost, can inform both the aware and unaware consumers about the average quality of the
group.
The collective label can be seen as a common regional label that certifies the producers
meeting the quality standard s. The quality standard is defined in the code of practice, which
is open for the public with the label certification. Therefore, consumers (both the aware and
unaware) know the minimum quality of the label, but may not know the precise quality level
of a producer belonging to the collective label. This assumption captures the idea that a
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collective label can reach more of the general public than the specific names. For instance,
an unaware consumer cannot recognize the quality of a given Valpolicella producer alone,
but she can infer the quality from the regional Valpolicella label, while aware consumers
can have a good knowledge of the different producers. In order to develop the collective
label, costs due to certification, advertising, promotion, etc., arise, and are shared among
the producers in the regional group. We assume that the producer mass is large enough that
the cost born by each producer is negligible.
Overall, these assumptions are consistent with experimental evidence. For instance,
Gustafson (2015) investigates the effects of information provisions regarding Napa Valley
and its Oakville nested AVA, of supposedly better reputation. The experimental evidence
shows that, “high knowledge consumers value Oakville more than Napa Valley while the
sample of participants on average valued Napa Valley more than Oakville” (p. 41). They
also match common industry trends.10 In addition, these assumptions can be justified in
terms of search costs as well (see, e.g., Varian, 1980, Chan and Leland, 1982): aware con-
sumers (‘informed consumers’ in their jargon) pay lower search costs and can easily spot their
favorable products, whereas unaware consumers base their choices on the average product
characteristics. Moreover, assumptions about the branding and labeling costs capture the
idea that informing consumers is costly but enjoys some scale efficiency, that is, the larger
the group’s size, the smaller the cost born by an individual producer.11
Various name patterns may emerge as a result of the combination of different labeling
strategies adopted by the L and H producers. We focus on three name patterns: the uniform
name (denoted by U) adopted by both L and H producers in the region; nested names (N),
under which the H type producers develop their individual brand, using it together with the
collective label of the region; and separate names (S), under which the H producers develop
their individual brands separately from the collective label. Based on assumptions 1 and 2,
Table 1 summarizes consumers’ quality perceptions under the three name patterns.
Table 1: Quality perceptions under different names
Name pat-
terns
Labeling
Strategies
Aware
consumers’
perception
Unaware
consumers’
perception
Spillover Effects Examples
Uniform
name (U)
L: C s¯ In both aware and
unaware market
Previous Chianti &
H: C s¯ previous Valpolicella
Nested
names (N)
L: C s s¯ Only in the
unaware market
Valpolicella, Rioja,
H:C + I δ s¯ Bordeaux, etc.
Separate
names (S)
L: C s s
No spillover effect
Chianti vs.
H: I δ s0 Super-Tuscans
10For instance, regarding the US market for young consumers, industry practitioners suggest “not to enter
the US market alone, but grouped with other wine producers with the same regional identity” (LARVF,
2015).
11The model can be extended to a more general setting where the costs of informing consumers vary
with the proportion of aware consumers (α) and the group’s size (denote by z), that is, F (α, z), with
F (α, z) ∈ [0, f ] and Fα > 0 and Fz ≤ 0. Our simple setting implies that F (α, 0) = f for individual brands I
and F (α, 1) = 0 for the collective labels C.
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s¯ = βδ + (1− β)s: Average quality of the collective label;
s0: Minimum quality standard.
Table 1 suggests that consumers’ perception about the product’s quality varies according
to the awareness of the consumer and the labeling strategies under different names. Under
the uniform name (U), where both the L and H producers adopt the same collective label,
consumers know of the existence of the two qualities s and δ, but cannot distinguish which
quality is the product they purchase. Therefore, they see the products of L and H as
homogeneous, with an average quality s¯ = βδ + (1− β)s. Such a case corresponds with the
previous situation of Valpolicella and Chianti PDOs in the 1970s, before the creation of the
new PDO Chianti Classico and/or the establishment of individual brands.
Under the nested names (N), where individual brands are developed in addition to the
collective label, a similar situation occurs for the unaware consumers who have no knowledge
over the brands and perceive all products with the average quality s¯. However, the aware
consumers are able to distinguish the true quality with the help of the individual brands
(Assumption 1). This name pattern corresponds to Valpolicella wines and to many other
cases, such as Bordeaux and Rioja, to name only two.
Last, under the separate names (S), the L producers maintain their own collective label
without the participation of the H producers, possibly because these latter producers have
left the group. Consumers know the composition of the group and hence can identify the true
quality of the collective label s (which is also the average quality of the group). However,
without being nested with the collective label, the individual brands of H only reveal the true
quality to the aware consumers. In the eyes of the unaware consumers, they are not different
from the spot market quality s0 and, again, the lemon market problem arises for H in the
unaware market. This name pattern may correspond with the emergence of Super-Tuscan
wines, before the creation of the new Bolgheri PDO, and to other cases emerging in different
countries (see, e.g., Lewin, 2014 for France, and Mount, 2016 for Spain).
The quality perception specified in Table 1 reveals an important effect of our setting,
that is, the spillover effects. Whenever consumers lack precise information and perceive
the average quality s¯ for the products they purchase, the L producers benefit from positive
spillovers with their product being perceived as being of higher quality than its true level
(s¯ > s), whereas the H producers suffer from negative spillovers due to a lower perceived
quality (s¯ < δ). The spillover effects are higher under the uniform name, reduced somewhat
with nested names, and reduced further in the unaware market with separated names.
Table 1 thus summarizes three cases in which the L producers always use the collective
label, while the H producers have the option of choosing individual brands, together or sepa-
rate from the collective label. There may be three other possible cases: first, producers have
no incentive to adopt any labels or brands; second, the L producers adopt their own individ-
ual brands; or third, the H producers develop their collective label without the participation
of the L producers.
The first case may correspond to the situation in which labels convey no information,
because of, for example, a lack of well-defined property rights, such as is the case in developing
countries where the ‘quality standard’ is then equal to the minimum level. In our setting,
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both producers are clearly better off under the collective label defined in Assumption 2.
Indeed, the collective label informs the consumers that their qualities are at least at the
level s, instead of the spot market minimum level s0.
In the second case, the L producers may choose to display their individual names on
their products. But this is not a means of informing the consumers about their products’
true quality, which may be of lower quality in the region. We assume that there is some
minimum branding level normalized to zero for the L producers,12 for example, the winery’s
bottle label, and we refer to the individual brand as the one defined in Assumption 1. For
producer L, individual branding would entail cost f without generating any positive spillover
or benefit. Hence, such a strategy is clearly dominated by the collective label.
In the last case, if the collective label of the H producers can costlessly inform the aware
and unaware consumers about the true quality δ (which is also the average quality of the
H group), the H group would certainly adopt such a label. The L producers, being those
without the high-quality collective label, would not benefit from any spillover effects of the
label. We are thus in the first-best (perfect information) situation. A more interesting setting
is that the H producers can hardly form a group to develop a collective label, or if they can,
the label cannot perfectly inform all the consumers about the true quality. For example,
when H producers are small-sized and cannot coordinate to develop their own collective
label, or the cost of certifying and marketing the collective label is too high to be shared
among a limited number of H producers. In what follows, we investigate the situation in
which the H producers cannot coordinate to form the collective label, leaving the alternative
cases to be discussed in Section 5.1. In summary, we rule out the possibilities of no labels,
costly individual brands by the L producers, and high quality collective labels by the H
producers. Thus, we are left with the three name patterns in Table 1.
3.3 The game
We investigate the emergence of the different types of names from an initial market structure
where all producers form a coalition in a given region and where the name can only be used
by the producers who are members of this coalition.13 The quality and labeling decisions
are described in a three-stage game:14
• In stage 1, the producers’ coalition designs the code of practice, which defines the
quality standard s for the collective label;
• In stage 2, producers, observing the quality standard, decide whether to adopt the
collective name only, or to develop their individual brands separately, or to develop
their individual brands nested with the collective name;
12We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
13This market configuration is consistent with the existing GI labeling system in the EU, in which for
many products there exist a uniform group. Moreover, we astray from problems of sequential joining by
heterogeneous producers (as argued in Carter, 2015). We leave these alternative scenarios for future work.
14Another timing of the game, where the name pattern is chosen before the choice of the quality standard,
could also have been considered. We can show that it would generate similar qualitative results.
11
• In stage 3, given the labeling strategies, each producer (H and L) randomly meets a
consumer and decides the price. Consumers decide whether or not to buy from the
producer.
The first stage of the game involves the producers who are within the coalition to make a
collective decision on the level of the quality standard of the collective label. However, a
consequence of producer heterogeneity is that producers will have conflicting interests. The
quality choice thus depends on the decision process within the coalition of producers and
on how the coalition balances the divergent interests within the group. We assume a simple
majority rule: the quality standard is designed in the interests of the type of producers with
the largest population, anticipating the possible reaction of the other types when making
the quality decision. As shown in Section 2, the majority rule is a common decision-making
process within the producer groups using collective labels, for example, in Valpolicella and
Oltrepo` Pavese. In a given region, producers with intrinsically high qualities are often small
in number. We thus assume that the L producers have the majority (i.e., β < 1
2
) and focus
on a ‘L-majority rule’, under which the group of L producers makes the quality decision such
that it maximizes L’s profits, while trying to balance the conflicting interests of H.15
The second stage of the game specifies the name pattern chosen by producers under a
predetermined level of quality standard for the collective label. Provided that the L producers
will stick to the collective label, the name pattern hinges on the labeling choice of the H
producers. Specifically, the three name patterns described in Table 1 correspond to the
choice made by H producers to adopt the collective label without individual brands (i.e.,
the name ‘U’), to develop the individual brand nested with the collective label (‘N’) and to
develop the brand without the collective label (‘S’). It should be noticed that such timing
corresponds to the situation where the H producers are passive towards the quality standard
of the established collective label. In Section 5.1 we discuss an alternative situation where
the H producers are strongly rational and anticipate that their labeling choices will have an
impact on the standard setting made by the group.
The third stage of the game involves individual pricing decisions, which depend on the
competition setting and on the possibility for producers to price discriminate. Competition
among producers may affect their labeling choice, generating new effects in addition to the
spillover effects. To disentangle these effects, we first investigate the case where producers
behave as monopolists on the market so that they can charge up to the consumers’ willingness
to pay, which depends on the quality perception of consumers. We will then discuss the
additional impact of competition in Section 5.4.
The quality perception can differ depending on the type of consumers. Table 1 shows
15The L-majority rule is obviously a simplification of the decision process inside the coalition. Depending
on the distribution of the producers, their political power or their ability to bargain, there may exist other
decision rules which affect the equilibrium name patterns and the level of quality standards. Our results
will be affected if the political power of the H producers becomes more important, because the decision will
then be biased towards their interests. In this case, the H producers would choose the highest standard δ to
prevent the negative spillover of the L producers. As a result, the L producers, unable to reach such a high
standard, will choose to separate from H and create their own collective labels in such a first-best (perfect
information) situation. However this outcome can only be achieved when the H producers have the power
and can implement the standard without cost. So long as the L producers have the power to choose the
standard, our results will not qualitatively change.
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that with the same label, the quality perception may be different for the aware and unaware
consumers. In such a situation, monopolist producers may choose to discriminate among
consumers and charge different prices according to their willingness to pay. Perfect discrim-
ination is possible for instance when retailing channels are different, or when markets are
geographically separated. For example, the Chinese market for Bordeaux wine becomes at-
tractive not only because of the potential size of the market, but also because of the hugely
overpriced bottles preferred by Chinese consumers (Thompson, 2015). In many other sit-
uations, however, it may be difficult or impossible to charge different prices and prevent
consumers’ arbitrage. In the following, we start with a simple case where each monopolistic
producer can perfectly discriminate between the aware and unaware consumers. We shall
discuss how the results may change when price discrimination is not possible in Section 5.2.
4 Equilibrium standard and name patterns
In this section, we first investigate the conflicting interests of producers under different
name patterns and show how the quality standard may be set by the L group to balance
the interests and achieve the desirable name pattern. We then derive the equilibrium name
pattern, which may vary with the producer and consumer heterogeneities. Furthermore, we
derive the welfare effects of the equilibrium labeling strategies and show how a particular
name pattern impacts economic welfare.
4.1 Labeling choice under the quality standard
The game is solved by backward induction. The third stage pricing decision is easily derived:
under perfect price discrimination, the monopolist producers can charge prices up to the
consumers’ willingness to pay. Given the utility function U(s, p) = s− p defined in the basic
setting (Section 3.1), the consumers’ willingness to pay is equal to the level of the perceived
quality, described in Table 1. We can then solve for the producers’ labeling choice (stage 2),
which depends on the comparison of the expected profits under the different name patterns,
taking into account the different information conveyed by the collective label and individual
brands. Denote by piji (s) the profit of a producer of type i (i ∈ {L,H}) under the name j,
j ∈ {‘U’, ‘N’, ‘S’}. The expected profits for each producer are derived in Table 2.
Comparing the profit levels under the different name patterns, the first result is that
the separate name pattern ‘S’ is dominated by the other strategies for both the L and H
producers. Indeed, the L producers cannot benefit from any spillover effect (captured by
s¯, with s¯ > s) when the H producers are not in the collective label coalition, while the H
producers strictly prefer to be part of the collective label nested with their individual brand
(N) and to be seen as s¯ rather than being out of the coalition (S) and not being recognized
by the unaware consumers.16 We will thus focus on the comparison of the uniform name
(‘U’) and nested names (‘N’).
16Situations where the separate name pattern can arise in equilibrium can be possible in other settings,
e.g., when producers compete in price or when price discrimination is not possible. Such situations will be
discussed in Section 5.
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Table 2: Expected profits under different names
Name
patterns
Labeling
Strategies
Profit of L Profit of H
U
L: C
piUL (s) = s¯− Φ(s) piUH(s) = s¯H: C
N
L: C
piNL (s) = αs+(1−α)s¯−Φ(s) piNH (s) = αδ + (1− α)s¯− fH: C+I
S
L: C
piSL(s) = s− Φ(s) piSH(s) = αδ + (1− α)s0 − fH: I
s¯ = βδ + (1− β)s;
s0: Minimum quality standard.
Second, given the quality standard s, L producers strictly prefer the uniform name rather
than the nested names, as they can benefit from the maximal spillover under the uniform
name pattern while the spillover effect is reduced under the nested names pattern. Therefore,
the second stage subgame equilibrium name pattern hinges on the choice of the H producers.
Lemma 1 summarizes these results:
Lemma 1 Under perfect price discrimination and monopolistic competition, for a given
quality standard s:
i) L producers strictly prefer the uniform name pattern;
ii) H producers prefer the uniform name pattern if and only if: s ≥ sˆU ≡ δ− f
α(1−β) ; otherwise,
they prefer the nested names.
The inequality in Lemma 1 is directly derived from the comparison between the profits
of H producers under the uniform and the nested names patterns, that is piUH(s) ≥ piNH (s).
Intuitively, the H producers are facing a trade-off between developing costly individual brands
to attract aware consumers, and using the uniform name only but suffering from the negative
spillovers from L producers. They will choose the latter only if the L producers’ quality is
not too low.
From Lemma 1, the minimum threshold sˆU required by H producers to be part of the
uniform name pattern is higher the more heterogeneous producers are in quality provision
(∂sˆ
U
∂δ
> 0), the greater the proportion of aware consumers (∂sˆ
U
∂α
> 0). When the heterogeneity
between L and H producers and the proportion of aware consumers are high enough, the H
producers will have an incentive to switch to the nested names pattern, while the L producers
would like the H producers to adopt the collective label only. In this case, in which L and
H have divergent interests over the name patterns, the L group may have an incentive to
increase the quality standard to balance these divergences.
In stage 3, the L-majority sets the quality standard to maximize the profit of L producers,
taking into account the possible impact on the labeling decisions. The problem of the L-
majority is similar to a principal-agent problem, where the L group (the principal) proposes
a standard s to the H producers (the agents).17 The H producers decide whether to accept
the contract or to reject it. If the H producers reject the contract – provided that the L
17We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
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producers always prefer the collective label to the individual names – the H producers can
only deviate to develop their own individual brands, either by nesting it with the collective
label (‘N’) or by separating altogether from the collective label (‘S’). Formally, if the L-
majority wants to implement the uniform name, it will choose the standard that maximizes
the following problem:
max
s
piUL (s) = s¯− Φ(s) (2)
s.t. piUH(s) ≥ max{piNH (s), piSH(s)};
where the second condition is the participation constraint for H producers to accept the
uniform name pattern. Note that this condition is equivalent to the condition stated in
Lemma 1, that is, s ≥ sˆU . The results of problem (2) are summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The quality standard sU chosen by the L-majority group in the uniform name
case solves 1− β = Φ′(s) if and only if:
δ < δˆ(α, ·) ≡ f
α(1− β) + s
U . (3)
Otherwise, the standard is set at sˆU ≡ δ − f
α(1−β) , with sˆ
U > sU and piUL (sˆ
U) < piUL (s
U).
If the level of heterogeneity is not too high, the L group can set their optimal level of
quality. However, if the level of heterogeneity becomes higher, the participation constraint
of the H producers becomes binding and the L group has to ‘distort’ the quality standard up
to sˆU in order to keep the H producers in the uniform name pattern. This strategy is costly
for the L producers as their profits will decrease with the level of the standard sˆU . We will
refer to this situation as the ‘constrained uniform name’ case (denoted by ‘CU’).
The equilibrium standard setting depends on whether the L-majority wants to implement
the uniform name or the nested names, which is determined by the comparison of L’s profits
under these two different name patterns. Figure 1 plots the profit curves of L under the
uniform name (piUL (s)) and the nested names (pi
N
L (s)). Because pi
U
L (s) > pi
N
L (s), the curve
piUL (s) is above pi
N
L (s). Define s
N the standard that maximizes L’s profit under the nested
names “N”.18 It is easily shown that sN > sU and piNL (s
N) < piUL (s
U). The quality incentives
for L under the nested names pattern are higher than under the uniform name because the
latter enables the L producers to enjoy the maximum spillover from H and hence they have
lower incentives to improve quality.
However, in equilibrium the quality standard has to take into account the participation
constraint of H producers, which depends on the level of sˆU . When sˆU is small (sˆU ≤ sU),
this participation constraint is not binding. The L group achieves the maximum profit
piUL (s
U) with a uniform name ‘U’, choosing the (unconstrained) standard sU . On the other
18Formally, if the L-majority wants to implement the nested names, the quality standard should be set such
that maxs pi
N
L (s) s.t. pi
N
H (s) = αδ+ (1−α)s¯− f ≥ αs+ (1−α)s¯, where the right-hand side of the constraint
corresponds to the profit that H can gain by commingling with the L producers without individual brands.
This constraint is trivially satisfied, because whenever nested names become the candidate equilibrium
name pattern, it must be δ > δˆ (Lemma 2). Therefore, the equilibrium quality standard is chosen at the
unconstrained level sN , which solves 1− β + αβ = Φ′(s).
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Figure 1: Profit change with the standard (with δ = 2.0, α = 0.5, β = 0.33,Φ(s) = s
2
2
)
hand, when sˆU > sU , the participation constraint is binding. The L group thus chooses
sˆU , leading to the constrained uniform name pattern ‘CU’. The profit of the L producers
decreases along the curve piUL (sˆ
U) when sˆU becomes larger. If sˆ is very large, maintaining
such a high standard is too costly for the L producers and the ‘CU’ name pattern becomes
dominated by the nested names ‘N’ (piUL (sˆ
U) < piNL (s
N)).
Let’s define sNU = {s|piNL (sN) = piUL (s)} as the standard level that makes L indifferent
between ‘CU’ and ‘N’. The L group switches to a lower standard sN (sN < sˆU) if sˆU surpasses
the level sNU . Based on Figure 1, we can thus infer that the equilibrium name pattern may
vary from the (unconstrained) uniform name ‘U’, to a constrained one ‘CU’ and to the
nested names ‘N’, depending on the comparison of sˆU with the two thresholds sU and sNU .
As these thresholds are functions of the parameters, the equilibrium thus depends on the
range of parameters. Proposition 1 formally shows these results.
Proposition 1 Under perfect price discrimination and monopolistic competition, there ex-
ists δˆ(α, ·) which solves sˆU = sU , and δNU(α, ·) which solves sˆU = sNU for δ, such that
∂δˆ(α,·)
∂α
< 0, ∂δ
NU (α,·)
∂α
< 0, δNU(α, ·) > δˆ(α, ·) and:
• if δ ≤ δˆ(α, ·), that is, if producers are not very heterogeneous in quality and consumers
are mostly unaware, the L-majority choose standard sU , leading to the uniform name
pattern ‘U’;
• if δˆ(α, ·) < δ ≤ δNU(α, ·), that is, if producer heterogeneity and consumers’ awareness
are at intermediate levels, the L-majority chooses the standard sˆU , with sˆU > sU ,
leading to the constrained uniform name pattern ‘CU’; and
• if δ > δNU(α, ·), that is, if producers become very heterogeneous and/or a large pro-
portion of consumers are aware, the L-majority chooses standard sN , with sN < sˆU ,
leading to the nested names pattern ‘N’.
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Proof The first item of the result for δ ≤ δˆ(α, ·) is straightforward according to Lemma 2.
The proof for the two remaining items depends on the comparison of sˆU and sNU , which is
equivalent to comparing piUL (sˆ
U) and piNL (s
N). The two profits are derived as follows:
piUL (sˆ
U) = βδ + (1− β)sˆU − Φ(sˆU), with sˆU ≡ δ − f
α(1− β)
piNL (s
N) = (1− α)βδ + (1− β + αβ)sN − Φ(sN).
It can be easily checked that
∂2piUL (sˆ
U )
∂δ2
= −Φ′′ < 0 and ∂piNL (sN )
∂δ
= (1− α)β > 0. Thus piUL (sˆU)
is continuous and concave in δ, while piNL (s
N) is increasing with δ. Moreover, when δ = δˆ,
sˆU = sU < sN and hence piUL (sˆ
U) = piUL (s
U) > piNL (s
N). On the other hand, when δ increases
from δˆ, then sˆU increases accordingly. It can be shown that when δ = sN + f
α(1−β+αβ) , the
revenue part of piUL (sˆ
U) and piNL (s
N) are the same and sˆU > sN , so that the cost part of piUL (sˆ
U)
is larger. Hence piUL (sˆ
U) < piNL (s
N) when δ = sN + f
α(1−β+αβ)). By continuity, there exists
δNU ∈ (δˆ, δ˜), which solves piUL (sˆU) = piNL (sN) such that if δ > (<)δNU , piUL (sˆU) < (>)piNL (sN).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 is intuitive. When the heterogeneity between producers is relatively small
or when a large proportion of consumers are unaware, a small increase in quality standard
is enough to keep the H producers in the uniform label so that the uniform name pattern
is chosen. Otherwise, the nested names pattern is preferred because of the lower quality
standard it requires, while the L producers benefit from having H producers in the uniform
label targeting the market of unaware consumers.
Figure 2: Equilibrium labeling schemes
The equilibrium standard depends on the thresholds sˆU and sNU , that are functions of
the degree of producer heterogeneity (δ) and consumer awareness (α). Figure 2 plots the
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equilibrium labeling schemes in the α−δ space. The parameter range is separated into three
regions. In the lower-left region, where the producer heterogeneity is relatively small and
consumers are mostly unaware, the uniform name is achieved without constraint. This case
may resemble those situations in which producers are relatively homogeneous and/or not yet
known by consumers.19 In such a case, conflicts of interest among producers are not so severe
and the uniform name is more prominent. In the upper-right region, where producers become
very heterogeneous and consumers are more aware about the quality information conveyed
by the brand names, nested names emerge. This may resemble, for instance, the case of
Amarone wines, where the heterogeneity within the group is intensified, more consumers are
aware about individual producers, and so the group lets the high-quality types use nested
names.
Proposition 1 does not only provide the economic conditions under which the nested
names may emerge, but it also suggests that a change in the economic environment (change
in the level of heterogeneity between producers or in the fraction of aware consumers) may
have a non-monotonic impact on the quality provision of L producers. To see this, Figure 3
plots the equilibrium quality standard and profits for L and H producers as functions of δ
(for a given value of α) and α (for a given value of δ). From Figure 3, the equilibrium name
pattern switches from the uniform name to the nested names pattern when – everything else
constant – the producer heterogeneity becomes large (the left panels) or when there are more
aware consumers (the right panels). The equilibrium quality standard increases with δ and
α when the uniform name is constrained. However, whenever the nested names pattern is
chosen instead of the uniform name pattern, the quality standard drops from sˆU to sN . To
this extent, the emergence of the nested names, although enabling the H quality producers to
differentiate from the collective label, may have a negative impact on the quality incentives
of majority producers.
These results provide new insights on the rationale of labeling differentiation. The lit-
erature on quality standards and product differentiation generally argues that producers
differentiate their quality (or variety) to attract consumers with different tastes (see, e.g.,
Bonroy and Constantatos, 2015) and/or to soften competition in homogeneous product mar-
kets (see, e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982). By abstracting from consumers’ taste heterogeneity
and product competition, our model highlights an additional motive for labeling differenti-
ation, that is, the attempt of heterogeneous producers to balance divergent interests within
the group. Indeed, both L and H producers benefit from the nested names pattern. By
allowing H producers to develop their individual brands tied with the collective label, L
producers can still benefit from the positive spillovers of the high quality provided by H
producers, while H producers can reach out to unaware consumers with a relatively higher
perceived average quality.
Proposition 1 enables us to also derive some testable predictions: whereby nested (uni-
form) names are more likely to be observed when consumers are more (less) aware and/or
when producers are more (less) heterogeneous. Some ideas can be provided to measure
consumers’ information and producer heterogeneity. Regarding awareness, while important
19This seems consistent, for instance, with the practioners’ advice to wine producers “to group with other
wine producers with the same regional identity” when facing young (and thus unaware) US consumers
(LARVF, 2015).
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in our model it has played no role in previous literature, neither empirically nor theoreti-
cally. Then, for instance, one could look at consumers’ choices, varying with distance and/or
across time. Awareness about the quality of a wine may decrease in relation to the distance
from the production area, or may increase with long established labels. Ceteris paribus,
consumers should use more collective labels than private ones the more distant from the
region or the shorter the history of the label they purchase. Using an empirical application
similar to Costanigro et al. (2010), one could thus test whether distance (or other proxies
for awareness or lack of it) is significant.
Regarding the heterogeneity within production areas, a possible way to test this is to
check for differences in land prices. Better land quality would capitalize into land mar-
ket values, as producers should recognize these differences. Our results suggest that the
larger such differences are, the more likely we are to observe more differentiated labels.20
Moreover, notice that Costanigro et al. (2012) show that nested names are associated with
heterogeneity, leading them to conclude that nested names “are inherently prone to intra-
regional controversies” (p. 262). In other words, they believe that nested names may lead to
heterogeneity and thus conflicts. Given our results, we would argue for a reverse causality,
thus implying that empirical applications should not only explicitly consider heterogeneity
but also implement a suitable strategy to identify casuality.
Last, previous models (e.g., Winfree and McCluskey, 2005, Castriota and Delmastro,
2015) predict that ‘conflicts’, for example, free-riding, increase with the size of the group. In
our model we argue that besides size – which we do not explicitly consider – heterogeneity
has a role in explainining conflicts because of different spillover effects. For instance, our
model may imply that a relatively small but heterogeneous group may be more conflict-
prone. Other models (see, e.g., Castriota and Delmastro, 2015) are relatively agnostic about
heterogeneity, but we believe that it should be considered in empirical applications.
4.2 Welfare analysis
Social welfare is a function of the quality standard, given the costs of quality provision for
L producers and the costs for developing a private brand for H producers:
W (s) = β(δ − f1{‘N ′,‘S′}) + (1− β)(s− Φ(s)), (4)
where 1j = 1 if the name pattern involves the scheme j (j ∈ {‘N ′, ‘S ′}) and 0 otherwise. As
discussed in the previous section, the separate names ‘S’ is not present in equilibrium, and
we thus focus on the welfare comparison of the uniform and the nested names pattern. To
simplify notation, W (sU), W (sˆU) and W (sN) will be respectively denoted by WU , WˆU and
WN . We first compare welfare between nested names and uniform name (WU vs. WN) when
20Notice that product quality is the result of nature (that is, land quality) and nurture (that is, producer’s
efforts). The latter may change with the incentive structures embedded in different institutional settings,
for example, labeling regulations. Ideally, one could ascertain whether nature is more or less important
than nurture by considering, for instance, data on land transactions in the case of the ‘same area’ with
different producers and of the same producer in different areas. All other things equal, by considering
differences within the same areas one could gauge a measure of differences across producers, that is, a proxy
for ‘nurture’, while looking, for example, at differences within producers one could gauge the differences
across areas, that is, a proxy of ‘nature’.
19
the participation constraint for H producers is not binding (δ < δˆ). We then investigate the
welfare comparison of the constrained uniform name with the nested names (WˆU vs. WN).
4.2.1 Comparing welfare under ‘U’ and ‘N’ patterns
The welfare difference between the uniform names pattern and the nested names pattern is
given by:
WU −WN = (1− β) ((sU − Φ(sU))− (sN − Φ(sN)))+ βf (5)
with sU = {s|1 − β = Φ′(s)} and sN = {s|1 − β + αβ = Φ′(s)}. The two quality levels are
independent of δ. Hence, the welfare comparison does not depend on producer heterogeneity.
Indeed, producer heterogeneity in our setting does not affect L producer’s quality incentives
at the margin. The impact of δ stems from the change in the labeling strategies as producers
have different incentives to provide qualities under the different name patterns. As shown
in Lemma 3, the comparison depends on the consumers’ awareness parameter α.
Lemma 3 Under perfect price discrimination and monopolistic competition, there exists a
threshold αW (f, ·) = {α|WU = WN}, with ∂αW (f,·)
∂f
> 0, such that WU ≤ WN (respectively
WU > WN) if and only if α ≥ αW (f, ·)( respectively α < αW (f, ·)).
Proof: It can be derived from Equation (5) that ∂W
U−WN
∂α
= −(1− β)ds−Φ(s)
ds
|s=sN ∂sN∂α < 0.
The negative sign stems from the fact that sN < s∗ (s∗ = arg max s − Φ(s)) and sN solves
1 − β + αβ = Φ′(s), increasing in α. When α → 0, sN → sU and hence WU − WN →
βf > 0; when α→ 1, sN → s∗, which is the first-best quality level. It is naturally assumed
that the welfare under the first best quality is maximized. Thus, we have WU < WN .
Therefore, by continuity, there exists αW ∈ {0, 1} such that WU ≤ (or >)WN if and only
if α ≥ (or <)αW . αW solves WU = WN and is a function of f . It is easily checked that
∂αW (f,·)
∂f
= −
(
∂WU−WN
∂f
)
/
(
∂WU−WN
∂α
)
> 0. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 3, the nested names pattern leads to higher welfare than the uniform
name pattern for larger values of α or smaller values of f . The efficiency of the nested
names depends on a trade-off between two effects. On the one hand, such a name pattern
reduces the spillover effects for L producers and increases their overall quality provision by
perfectly informing the aware consumers through individual brands. On the other hand,
such a strategy is costly. As a result, the nested names will be welfare improving only if a
high enough proportion of consumers are aware and/or if the cost of doing so is small.
4.2.2 Comparing welfare under ‘CU’ and ‘N’ patterns
Analogously, we can derive the welfare difference between the constrained uniform name
pattern and the nested names pattern:
WˆU −WN = (1− β) ((sˆU − Φ(sˆU))− (sN − Φ(sN)))+ βf. (6)
It can be noticed that, differing from the previous case, sˆU now depends on both δ and
α, which makes the comparison less straightforward. Lemma 4 summarizes the results:
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Lemma 4 Under perfect price discrimination and monopolistic competition, there exists
δW (α, ·) = {δ|WˆU = WN}, with δW (α, ·) > δNU(α, ·) and ∂δW (α,·)
∂α
< 0 such that:
i) if δ ≥ δW (α, ·), the nested names pattern emerges in equilibrium, and leads to higher
welfare than the uniform name pattern;
ii) if δNU(α, ·) ≤ δ < δW (α, ·), the nested names pattern emerges in equilibrium, but leads
to lower welfare than the uniform name pattern;
iii) if δ < δNU(α, ·), the uniform name emerges in equilibrium and leads to higher welfare
than the nested names so long as δ is not too small compared to δNU(α, ·).
Proof: Notice that WˆU−WN = (pˆiUL + pˆiUH)−(piNL + piNH). At δ = δUN , pˆiUL = piNL . Moreover,
sˆU > sN from the proof of Proposition 1. Hence pˆiUH > pi
N
H , leading to Wˆ
U > WN . When
δ becomes very large, sˆU increases but not sN . There can be the case that sˆU surpasses
the social optimal level, that is, sˆU > s∗, so that ∂Wˆ
U−WN
∂δ
= (1 − β)ds−Φ(s)
ds
|s=sˆU ∂sˆU∂δ < 0.
The negative sign stems from the fact that s= arg max s−Φ(s) and ∂sˆU
∂δ
> 0 from Lemma 3.
Moreover, the second derivative ∂
2WˆU−WN
∂δ2
= (1− β)d2(s−Φ(s))
ds2
|s=sˆU ∂sˆU∂δ < 0. By continuity, if
sˆU is very large, so that Φ(sˆU) is very high, it may be the case that WˆU−WN < 0. Therefore,
there exists a threshold δW such that WˆU ≥ (or <)WN if and only if δ ≤ (or >)δW .
δW solving WˆU = WN is a function of α and δW > δNU . From condition (6), we have
∂δW
∂α
= −
(
∂WˆU−WN
∂α
)
/
(
∂WˆU−WN
∂δ
)
= −
(
ds−Φ(s)
ds
|s=sˆU ∂sˆU∂α − ds−Φ(s)ds |s=sN ∂s
N
∂α
)
/
(
∂WˆU−WN
∂δ
)
<
0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 implies that nested names welfare dominate the constrained uniform name if the
producer heterogeneity and/or the aware consumers’ population is very large. In this case,
L producers would have to impose a very high standard in order to keep the H producers in
the uniform group. However, the cost of improving quality is so high that the constrained
uniform name pattern is neither privately nor socially optimal. For an intermediate range of
these parameters, on the other hand, the private incentives to let the nested names emerge
leads to a lower welfare than the constrained uniform name pattern ‘CU’.
4.2.3 Overall welfare result
Based on Lemmas 3 and 4 and linking to Proposition 1, the overall welfare results are
summarized in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 Under perfect price discrimination and monopolistic competition, the choice
of the quality standard of the L-majority group is socially optimal for all ranges of α and δ
but two cases:
i) when δNU(α, ·) ≤ δ < δW (α, ·), nested names emerge in equilibrium but may lead to
lower welfare than the uniform name because of a lower quality standard;
ii) when δ < δˆ(α, ·) and α ≥ αW (f, ·), the uniform name emerges in equilibrium but may
lead to lower welfare than the nested names.
The two ranges of parameters capture two cases where the equilibrium is welfare deteriorat-
ing. Those ranges can be illustrated in Figure 2. The first case arises in a range of parameters
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such that the nested names pattern is chosen in equilibrium while the constrained uniform
name pattern would be better from a welfare point of view. This situation could emerge
when the heterogeneity across producers is high compared to the proportion of unaware con-
sumers. In this case, nested names are characterized by a lower quality standard, while the
constrained uniform name could be achieved under a high quality standard with a socially
affordable cost.
The second case corresponds to low values of δ and high values of α (shaded area at the
bottom right-hand side of the picture). In this case, the uniform name pattern would be
chosen by the L group while the nested names pattern would be better from a welfare point
of view because a large proportion of consumers are aware and could benefit from the high
quality.21 The welfare impact can be illustrated by simulating the welfare changes with the
parameters. The bottom sub-figures of Figure 3 show that welfare in equilibrium also varies
in a non-monotonic, discontinuous manner with respect to increases in α and δ parameters.
Our results thus provide some interesting insights in terms of welfare implications. First,
because nested names enable high-quality producers to differentiate themselves from low-
quality products, it is in general good to allow them to use such an information device
when they have the private incentives to do so. However, the highest level of welfare may be
achieved under the uniform label in cases where L producers have incentives to increase their
quality standard to keep H producers within the group (as shown in Figure 3). This situation
arises where there are not too significantly high levels of consumer awareness. Therefore, if
an increase in the fraction of aware consumers α induces the group to implement the nested
names, it may result in a lower quality provision and hence a decrease in welfare.
This latter result differs from the standard literature on quality and information, which
illustrates that the better the information provided to consumers the higher the quality
incentives for producers (see, e.g., Chapter 2 in Tirole, 1988 and Bagwell and Riordan,
1991). In this literature, the existence of aware consumers creates a positive externality
to unaware consumers because it induces producers to provide high quality. In our model,
we emphasize another economic effect: taking into account heterogeneity of producers, our
results imply that increasing the proportion of aware consumers (to a moderate extent) may
exert a negative externality over the unaware consumers by altering the labeling choice of
opportunistic producers. When the group switches to the nested names, the incentives to
raise quality standard decrease, leading to a lower welfare than that in the uniform collective
label.
5 Robustness of the main results
In the primary setting, we have derived two main results:
• Result 1. The nested names pattern arises because: i) producers become more het-
erogeneous (i.e., with an increase in δ); and/or ii) a larger proportion of consumers
become aware (i.e., an increase in α).
21The upper bound of the shaded area surpasses the δˆ curve. This implies that when the uniform name
pattern is constrained (‘UC’) for higher values of δ, by continuity the ‘U’ pattern is still welfare dominated
by the ‘N’ pattern.
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• Result 2. Whenever the nested names pattern emerges in place of the uniform name,
it may lead to lower quality incentives for the majority’s producers (i.e., a decrease in
s).
The key drivers of these two results are the spillover effects from which the L producers can
benefit when they supply consumers who are unaware about quality. Therefore, as long as
the spillover effect exists, the main results should hold qualitatively.
In this section, we check the robustness of the main results when changing the main as-
sumptions of our setting. In Subsection 5.1, we first discuss the possibility that H producers
can deviate collectively instead of individually. Then, in Subsection 5.2, we consider the sit-
uation where producers cannot discriminate between consumers, or where the nested names
pattern can be used to signal qualities (see Subsection 5.3). Finally, Subsection 5.4 considers
the situation where producers can compete in a market where consumers have heterogeneous
tastes over quality.22 The robustness of our main results under the various assumptions is
summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Robustness of the main results
Setting
Result 1: Nested
names arise be-
cause
Result 2:
Consequences
Other results
i) δ ↗ ii) α↗ s↘
Collective/rational
deviation of H
Yes Yes Yes Nested names more likely to emerge
No price discrimi-
nation
Yes It de-
pends
Yes Separate names emerge when α be-
comes very large
Nested brand sig-
naling
Yes N.A. Yes Welfare is larger under the nested
names than under the uniform name
Heterogeneous taste consumers and producer competition
Perfect (quantity)
competition
N.A. Yes Yes Welfare under the nested names
may be larger when numerous
producers compete for a small size
market
Sophisticated
consumers
N.A. Yes Yes
Oligopolistic
price competition
Spillover effects vanishe – only separate names exist in equilibrium.
5.1 Collective or rational deviation of H producers
In the model presented in Section 4, the H producers are passive and cannot coordinate to
develop their own collective label. In this section, we check the robustness of the main results
when a more sophisticated behavior for the H producers is considered, and analyze first the
case where H producers may coordinate to develop their own collective label. A reasonable
assumption is that such a collective label may inform more consumers than could a private
22We thank an anonymous referee and the editor for pointing out some of these possible market behaviors.
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brand but still incur some costs for the H producers because they are only a few. In this
case, the participation constraint for H becomes:
piUH(s) ≥ piNH (s) = αHδ + (1− αH)s¯− fH ,
where αH > α and fH < f . The analysis remains unchanged compared to the primary
setting. The equilibrium name still follows the same pattern as illustrated in Figure 2,
except that nested names now become the case of a sub-group high-quality collective label
nested under the grand collective label.23 Results 1 and 2 still hold with collective deviation.
A second possible behavior may be that the H producers are strongly rational and could
anticipate that if they deviate from the uniform name, the quality standard will not be the
actual choice made by the L-majority. Instead, the standard (at the off-equilibrium path)
should be the rational choice of the L-majority given H producers deviating to develop their
individual brands, that is, sN . With this setting, the participation constraint for H producers
becomes piUH(s) ≥ piNH (sN). Solving for the equilibrium follows the same methodology used
in the initial model and leads to similar results as seen in Proposition 1. Therefore, Results
1 and 2 still hold except that the threshold functions are different.24
5.2 No price discrimination
In many situations, it is difficult or impossible for producers to charge different prices and
prevent consumers’ arbitrage. The only possible pricing policy is then a uniform price for all
consumers. In this case, there is a trade-off for monopolist producers facing consumers with
different quality perceptions (described in Table 1): charging a higher price for consumers
with higher quality perception, but losing the consumers who value quality at a lower level;
or charging a lower price, and being able to serve the whole market.
Appendix A provides a thorough analysis on the situation without price discrimination
(PD). The results are similar to Results 1 and 2 derived in the primary setting. The only
difference is that a separate names pattern emerges when a high proportion of consumers
become aware. The intuition stems from the fact that L producers no longer serve the
aware market under nested names if they cannot price discriminate, making the nested
names pattern less attractive for L producers. Indeed, when choosing the quality standard
to implement the name patterns, the L majority trades off between implementing the nested
names in order to enjoy a (smaller size) spillover in the unaware market but at the cost of no
purchase of the aware consumers, or choosing the separate names to cover both markets but
without any spillover. When aware consumers are predominant, the loss of aware consumers
outweighs the spillover benefits, leading to the emergence of separate names in equilibrium.
23This is the case, for instance, of the collective label system in Burgundy, which goes from the regional
to the village (and even climat) level.
24For instance, the participation constraint of H producers becomes s ≥ αδ+(1−α)sN − f(1−β) . Compared
with the value of threshold sˆU defined in the condition ii) of Lemma 1, the threshold value becomes larger,
implying that the L-majority should set the quality standard to a higher level in order to keep the H
producers staying with the uniform name. In other words, implementing the uniform name is more costly
for the L-majority in the case of rational H producers than with passive H producers. However, in both
cases, profits for L producers remain unchanged under the nested names pattern, suggesting that the nested
names pattern is more likely to be implemented when H producers are strongly rational than when they are
passive.
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5.3 Nested names as a signaling device
The primary setting assumes that the unaware consumers are naive and can get information
on quality only through the collective label. Then, the individual name is ineffective in
changing beliefs about quality. This is the case if the unaware consumers are ignorant about
the cost of the branding strategy and the existence of the aware consumers. In practice,
producers H may use individual brands and prices to signal high quality. Linking this to our
setting, the signaling possibility lies in the fact that the existence of the aware consumers and
the branding costs make the nested names a very costly strategy for the L quality producers.
Consequently, the unaware consumers believe that only H producers can afford to use the
nested names.25
Appendix B provides a thorough analysis of the signaling game. In such a game, the
pooling equilibrium corresponds to the situation in which both L and H producers choose the
uniform name without label differentiation, whereas the separating equilibrium corresponds
to the case of nested names where the H producers choose to develop individual brands and
signal the high quality, while the L producers remain in the collective label. We show that
the pooling equilibrium, that is, the uniform name pattern, exists when L producers’ quality
is high, whereas the separating equilibrium, that is, the nested names pattern, appears when
quality is low. The reason is that signaling high-quality is more difficult when the low quality
is not so different from the high quality level, that is, if producers are not so heterogeneous.
In this case, it is easier for the L producers to mimic the H producers by developing individual
brands and enjoying a high price.
Again, the equilibrium name pattern depends on the range of parameters. In particular,
we show that it depends on the producer heterogeneity parameter δ. When δ is large, the
L-majority may set a very high standard in order to implement the uniform name. However,
such a high standard may be costly, making the L-majority switch to nested names with a
lower quality standard. Results are thus similar to Results 1 and 2 in the primary setting.26
The difference from the primary setting may lie in the welfare comparison. When signaling is
possible, nested names lead to the socially optimal quality because they inform the unaware
consumers about the true quality of the L producers, and hence result in higher welfare than
the uniform name.
25The literature has extensively investigated various mechanisms of quality signals, including prices (e.g.,
Bagwell and Riordan, 1991, Shapiro, 1983, etc.), advertising (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1986), locations
(e.g., Vettas, 1999, Haucap et al., 1997), etc. While much of the literature relies on repeated purchases by
consumers who can punish the low-quality producers with a low future payment (e.g., Shapiro, 1983, Vettas,
1999, Haucap et al., 1997 ), the one-shot game in the present setting resembles Bagwell and Riordan (1986),
in which the signaling of quality depends on the existence of aware (in their jargon, ‘informed’) consumers.
The mechanism is much like that of the simple model of Tirole (1988) (see Chapter 2.3.1): the existence
of the informed consumer makes it costly for the low-quality monopolist to mimic the high-quality one.
However, the present model differs from previous work in that we introduce a costly branding strategy in
addition to price as signals of quality. Moreover, we endogenize the quality choice for the L producers, which
may affect the equilibrium choice of labeling strategies.
26The presence of the aware consumers is a necessary condition for the existence of the separating equilibria,
that is, the nested names pattern. However, it does not affect the pooling equilibria, that is, the uniform
name. Therefore we cannot derive the result linking it to the consumers’ awareness parameter α.
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5.4 Consumers with heterogeneous tastes and competition
A more general case would be the situation whereby numerous producers compete for con-
sumers with heterogeneous preferences over quality. In this case, the equilibrium name
pattern will be affected by the competition and the associated quantity decision of produc-
ers.
Appendix C provides a formal analysis of the impact of various types of competition.
Appendix C1 deals with the most common case where a large number of producers compete
perfectly in quantity and in a vertically differentiated market. The model is similar to
Moschini et al. (2008), where producers with increasing marginal costs face a demand a` la
Mussa and Rosen (1978), except that we take into account different quality perceptions of
consumers under different names, as described in Table 1. Again, we find similar results
as in the primary setting.27 Appendix C2 shows that the results are robust if we allow
consumers to be sophisticated enough to update their beliefs about the product quality
based on the anticipation of producers’ quantity decisions. However, when we investigate
the price competition of oligopolistic producers, Appendix C3 shows that Results 1 and 2 fail
to hold because neither the uniform name nor the nested names emerge. Only the separate
names pattern emerges in equilibrium.
To understand the intuition, first notice that Results 1 and 2 hinge on the incentives
for the L producers to exploit the maximum spillover effects while trying to balance the
conflicting interests within the group using different names. As long as the spillover effects
exist, the basic results will not change qualitatively. Second, the spillover effects occur only
if producers can react to the market price, which reflects the different quality perceptions
of consumers. When competition changes the way that the producers react to the market
price, the spillover effects may vanish, leading the group to choose quite a different name
pattern in equilibrium.
Linking this to the settings analyzed in Appendices C1 and C2, when producers with
increasing marginal costs compete, spillover effects are weakened under quantity competi-
tion. However, as long as the supply reacts to the downward demand curve, which captures
consumers’ quality perceptions under different names, the spillover effects exist in the same
vein as in the primary setting; that is, it is maximized under the uniform name, reduced
with nested names, and diminished under separate names. Therefore, Results 1 and 2 still
hold under perfect quantity competition. The only difference may lie in the welfare impacts.
Indeed, when quantity decisions are taken into account, the H producers are induced to
provide a larger quantity under nested names. This effect may outweigh the negative impact
on the quality of L producers, leading to a higher welfare under nested names than under
the uniform name. This is especially the case when competition becomes more intense (see
Figure C2).
When price competition is considered (Appendix C3), the equilibrium price is set up
to the marginal costs, implying that the spillover effect vanishes under the collective label.
Therefore the equilibrium is shaped by quite a different name pattern. Indeed, it is well
acknowledged that the role of labels to segment the market can help producers to restore
the market power and to capture the quality premium (Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Zago and
27The results only focus on the impact of consumers’ information α instead of δ because this parameter is
no longer a relevant measure for producer heterogeneity when producers also differ in quantities.
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Pick, 2004). However, in the presence of information asymmetry, the role of a collective
label is limited because consumers see the same quality for products carrying the uniform
label. Indeed, the collective labels are often seen as minimum quality standards (MQS)
for producers within the group (Petropoulou, 2013).28 In this case, collective labels may
intensify the competition for producers in the same group and hence squeeze their quality
premium. Consequently, the only candidate equilibrium is separate names, adopted by the
duopolistic producers L and H, respectively. Such a setting is similar to a setting where large
producers or firms compete imperfectly in the market with different qualities.
6 Concluding remarks
Starting with recent policy and industry debates, we present a model to investigate nested
names and the coexistence of different labels. When low-quality producers control the col-
lective label, they may prefer a uniform collective label because they benefit the most from
the efforts of high-quality producers. The latter, on the other hand, may still find it prof-
itable to join forces with lower-quality producers because with the collective label they can
reach unaware consumers and indirectly induce the low-quality producers to adopt a stricter
quality standard. When producers’ heterogeneity increases, however, the uniform label is
less profitable for high-quality producers, who may then prefer to establish individual brands
as well. Moreover, when producers cannot price discriminate or when they compete more
intensively in price, it may be profitable to use individual brands only and to avoid using
the common label, thus separating from it.
Our results explain some of the issues relevant in many food industries by the evidence we
document, in particular the coexistence of private and collective labels, the differentiation
within collective labels, and label fragmentation and proliferation. While our motivating
cases come mostly from the wine industry in the EU, our model and results can be related
to other industries, for example, cheese, cured meats, vegetables, etc., as well as to other
countries. From the industry’s point of view, the decision to use a more or less differentiated
label, and all the promoting activities that go with it, may simply depend on the destination
market. For new and/or distant markets, where presumably the component of unaware
consumers is significant, a uniform label may be a more effective tool. In closer (i.e., national)
or knowledgeable markets, where consumers have a good understanding of the products of
a region, then a more differentiated label or nested names may be more effective.
Overall, we show that private incentives lead to equilibria which are welfare-improving.
In a relatively low number of cases, however, private incentives are not aligned with total
welfare. These latter results are mainly driven by the desire of the majority group to enjoy
the spillovers of the uniform collective label, while trying to reduce the conflicts of interest
within the group. Our model identifies two ways in which to alleviate these conflicts: by
making the low-quality producers behave more like high-quality producers, or to enable the
latter to partially differentiate themselves. While the former leads to the constrained uniform
name, the latter drives to nested names.
According to GI’s regulations, in the EU and elsewhere, one of the objectives of collective
promotion is to ensure the quality of regional products (see, e.g., Article 1 of Regulation (EU)
28We thank the editor and anonymous referees for this comment and reference.
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No 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs). An interesting
implication of our paper is that the two ways to balance the conflicting interests within a
group may lead to different quality incentives for the majority of (lower-quality) producers.
The former may induce the group to set a higher quality standard for the majority producers
in order to retain and keep pace with the high-quality producers. To this extent, the uniform
collective labels in the presence of some degree of producer heterogeneity should be advocated
because it may lead to an overall higher quality level of the region.
However, the inner incentives to raise quality in line with high-quality producers vanish
if the latter are allowed to differentiate. Thus, there may be a drop in quality when nested
names arise in place of the uniform name. Such a negative impact on quality may even lead
to the lower economic welfare of nested names compared to the uniform label. Only when
there are more aware consumers can the nested names lead to higher welfare. To this extent,
our results imply that when a region cannot sustain the uniform collective label, making
more consumers aware may avoid or reduce the negative quality impact of nested names.
This may justify, for instance, the trade promotion policies that governments worldwide
implement by supporting individual producers in foreign markets (see, e.g., the EU wine
sector market-oriented measures as detailed in the Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008).
Another possible way to deal with this potential problem is to facilitate the coordination
of high-quality producers in developing their own collective label. By this means, they can
share the costs of reaching and informing a wider population of consumers: “Because it
is costly for consumers to acquire technical information on the quality of wines and the
reputation of wineries, institutional signals, such as that of the wine classification system,
can be useful as proxies for the aforementioned variables” (Castriota and Delmastro, 2015:
470). The most fitting case of this policy is probably the system of collective labels in
Burgundy, which go from the regional to the village (and climat) level.
Last, separate names are another possibility in providing more information to consumers,
and we show that the quality reaches the socially optimal level if high- and low-quality
producers’ labels are separate. Further extending our results, one may question how small a
label should be, or, in other words, how many sub-labels there should be in a given region. If
separating may be good for quality incentives, it may be confusing for consumers who may
have too many collective sub-labels to choose from; that is, too much information.
Our model is quite general, and our main results are robust to different extensions. We
consider labels as tools for signaling, the coalition formation of the high-quality types in the
minority, competition among producers and/or collective labels, and the explicit modeling of
quantity choices. However, we make some simplifying assumptions. For example, this model
does not consider the issue of ‘too much information’ for consumers – in fact our collective
label is a way to reach otherwise unaware consumers – which may be a problem implied by
the brand proliferation that follows from separation. We assume that the collective labels
(either the uniform or the sub-regional) are effective in conveying information. Like many
other contributions in the literature, we consider a static game with no room for reputation.
The size of the group is exogenously given and we do not analyze the formation of producer
groups. All of these assumptions may be amended, but we leave them for future studies.
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A Without price discrimination
In this appendix, we analyse how results are changed when producers cannnot discriminate
between consumers. All other assumptions remain. As consumers’ perceptions over qualities
differ according to their knowledge (as described in Table 1 in the primary model), without
price discrimination (PD) producers are facing a trade-off between charging higher price but
losing the consumers with a lower quality perception. The timing of the game is unchanged
and described in Section (3.3). In the no-PD setting, the monopolist pricing strategy in
the third stage of the game may differ. For instance, under the nested names pattern, the
L producers have a trade-off between targeting only the unaware consumers (1 − α) at an
average price s¯ or targeting the entire market at a lower price based on the true quality s.
Any price in the range (s, s¯) or outside this range cannot be an equilibrium price, because
L producers can always deviate to s or s¯ and gain a higher profit.
The same reasoning holds for the H producers: they have a trade-off between targeting
only the aware consumers at a high price δ using individual brands (generating a profit
αδ − f), or staying with the uniform name to capture the entire market at a lower price s¯.
Table A1 shows the pricing strategies and associated profits of producers under the
different name patterns. Compared with Table 2 in the primary setting, the uniform name is
the same as that in the case with PD. Moreover, it still results in the highest profit for the L
producers. However, under the nested names pattern, the L producers have to abandon the
aware consumers without the possibility of price discrimination. Whereas they can cover the
whole market at the price s under the sepatate names pattern because both the aware and
unaware consumers perceive the true quality of L. In this case, it is possible that the nested
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names pattern results in less profit than the separate names pattern, making this latter to
emerge in equilibrium.
Table A1: Prices and profits under different names
Name Labels Price in
aware
market
Price in
unaware
market
Profit of L Profit of H
U
L: C s¯
piUL (s) = s¯− Φ(s) piUH(s) = s¯H: C s¯
N
L: C - s¯
piNL (s) = (1− α)s¯− Φ(s) piNH (s) = αδ − fH:C + I δ -
S
L: C s
piSL(s) = s− Φ(s) piSH(s) = αδ − fH: I δ -
s¯ = βδ + (1− β)s: average quality of the collective label
Notice that whenever individual branding is chosen - either with or without the nested
names (N or S) - the H producers gain the same profit without price discrimination:
piNH = pi
S
H = αδ − f.
This profit serves as the outside option for the H producers when facing the decisions of the
L majority. Formally, if the L producer wants to implement the uniform name, the problem
can be described as
max
s
piUL (s) = βδ + (1− β)s− Φ(s)
s.t. piUH(s) = s¯ ≥ αδ − f
Lemma A1 summarizes the equilibrium quality standard outcome:
Lemma A1 Without PD, the quality standard under the uniform name is the same as that
in the case of PD, that is sU such that 1 − β = Φ′, if and only if the following inequality
holds:
δ < δˆ ≡ f + (1− β)s
U
(α− β) . (A1)
Otherwise, the standard is set at sˆU(δ, α, β) ≡ (α−β)δ−f
(1−β) , which is higher than s
U .
Comparing condition (A1) with condition (3) in the primary setting, it can be easily shown
that the right-hand side is larger and the constrained standard level is lower in condition
(A1). Therefore, without PD, it is less likely that the L majority ‘distorts’ the quality
standard upwards to keep the H producers in the coalition. Moreover, if the outside option
becomes attractive for the H producers, the standard is raised at a lower level compared to
the PD case.
Again, an increase in the quality standard to keep H in the uniform name reduces piUL (s).
Such an increase may thus lead L producers not to choose the uniform name but rather opt
for a lower standard and implement the nested or separate names patterns. The decrease
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in piUL (s) with the quality follows a pattern similar to the pattern described in the primary
setting and illustrated in Figure 1. However, which name pattern is chosen in equilibrium
depends on the comparison of optimal profits under ‘N’ and ‘S’. From Table A1, the optimal
profit for L under the separate names pattern is derived as:
max
s
piNL (s) = s− Φ(s).
The first order conditions 1 = Φ′(s) give the optimal quality standard sS = s∗. Because L
producers can be perfectly identified under the separate names pattern, the quality standard
is set at the first-best (perfect information) level. Similarly, the quality chosen by L producers
under the nested names pattern can be derived from the following maximization problem:
max
s
piNL (s) = (1− α)s¯− Φ(s) = (1− α)(βδ + (1− β)s)− Φ(s).
The optimal standard sN is given by the first order conditions:
(1− α)(1− β) = Φ′(s).
Compared with the first order conditions in the PD case (which is derived as 1− β + αβ =
Φ′(s) in footnote 18), it is straightforward to show that sN is lower than in the PD case
because the L producers have to leave the aware market, which gives them more incentives
to provide quality. The profit level under the nested names pattern piNL (s
N) is thus lower
than in the PD case, which implies that the L majority may now choose the separate names
pattern covering the whole market. Proposition A1 states the formal equilibrium results.
Proposition A1 Without PD, the separate names pattern S may be chosen in equilibrium.
There exists δNS, which solves piNL (s
N) = piSL(s
∗), and δSU , which solves piUL (sˆ
U) = piSL(s
∗) for
δ, such that
• if δSU < δNS and δSU < δ < δNS, the L majority chooses s∗, leading to the separate
names pattern in equilibrium;
• otherwise, the equilibrium follows the same patterns as in the primary setting provided
in Proposition 1.
Proof We have piNL (s
N) = (1−α)(βδ+(1−β)sN)−Φ(sN) increasing with δ and piSL = s∗−
Φ(s∗) independent of δ. Moreover, it can be easily checked that when δ = sU + pi
S
L(s
∗)−piSL(sU )
β
,
piNL (s
N) < piSL(s
∗); and when δ = s∗ + α
(1−α)βpi
S
L(s
∗), piNL (s
N) > piSL(s
∗). Thus, there exists a
threshold δNS, with δNS ∈ (sU + piSL(s∗)−piSL(sU )
β
, s∗ + α
(1−α)βpi
S
L(s
∗)), solving piNL (s
N) = piSL(s
∗)
for δ, such that if δ > (<)δNS, piNL (s
N) > (<)piSL(s
∗) and nested (separate) names become a
possible equilibrium.
If δ > δNS, the equilibrium outcome depends on the comparison of piUL (sˆ
U) and piNL (s
N).
The same argument as that stated in Proposition 1 applies. If δ < δNS, the equilibrium
depends on the comparison of piUL (sˆ
U) and piSL(s
∗). Similarly to the above analysis, there exists
a threshold δSU , which solves piUL (sˆ
U) = piSL(s
∗) for δ, such that if δ > (<)δSU , piUL (sˆ
U) <
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(>)piSL(s
∗) and the L majority will choose s∗ to implement the separate names pattern.
Proposition A1 follows. Q.E.D.
The equilibrium name patterns for different values of δ and α are illustrated in Figure
A1. Compared to Figure 2 in the PD case, nested names still arise when the producer het-
erogeneity is high enough (i.e., δ > max{δNU , δNS}). However, separate names may now
be chosen in equilibrium instead of nested names. This is particularly true when the pro-
portion α of aware consumers is large and for intermediate values of producer heterogeneity
δ. Indeed, when the L-majority chooses the standard to manipulate the labeling schemes,
they have to choose between implementing the nested names pattern and enjoy spillovers in
the unaware market but leaving the aware market, or choosing the separate names pattern
to cover both markets but without benefiting from any spillover. When the proportion of
aware consumers is larger than the proportion of unaware consumers and when producer
heterogeneity is not too high, the loss of aware consumers outweighs the spillover benefits,
leading to the emergence of separate names in equilibrium.
Simulation results with changes in δ and α are reported in Figure A2.29 Compared to
the PD case (Figure 3 in the primary setting), the equilibrium variables still change in a
discontinuous and non-monotonic way, because the equilibrium name pattern changes. In
particular, the separate names pattern emerges leading to a higher quality standard and
a higher welfare than the nested names pattern. However, the basic result derived in the
primary setting, that is, that the quality standard for the majority producers drops with
the emergence of the nested names pattern (either in place of the uniform name or of the
separate names pattern), still holds.
B Nested names as a signaling device
In this section, we consider a signaling game, in which the H producers can use individual
brands nested with the collective label to signal their high quality to consumers.
B.1 The signaling game model
The timing of the game is the same as in the primary setting. In the first stage, the L
majority decides the quality standard s (s < δ). Once the quality s is fixed, L producers
incur the cost Φ(s), which is sunk in the following stages and will not affect the ex-post
profit of producers. Therefore, the quality cost cannot be used as a signaling device that
could change consumers’ beliefs.
In the second stage, each producer decides whether to develop an individual brand nested
or not with the collective name, or to stay in the uniform coalition wihtout differentiating
from the L producers. The difference between the nested names pattern and the separate
names pattern for H producers lies in their ability to signal the high quality to unaware
consumers. Indeed, under the nested names H producers nested with the collective label for
which the lowest quality observed by unaware consumers is s; whereas under the separate
29We deliberately choose the parameter values δ = 0.8 and α = 0.7 that enables the name pattern to
emerge successively when the parameters change. Moreover, we set f = 0 for ease of calculation. Setting
f > 0 will not change the results qualitatively.
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names pattern, they cannot been identified by unaware consumers as they are in the spot
market and the lowest perceived quality of this market is the minimum quality standard s0
(s0 ≤ s). Therefore, signaling high quality from a regional group is easier than from the spot
market. In what follows, we thus assume that the separate names pattern is a dominated
strategy for H producers, and hence the choice set of the name patterns in the second stage
of the game is {U,N}.
In the third stage, each producer (H or L) randomly meets a consumer and individu-
ally decides the price. Consumers decide whether to purchase from the producer based on
observed prices and labels. In the third stage, consumers face a product with two possible
quality levels δ and s (depending on the predetermined quality standard). Their prior dis-
tribution is β and 1− β, respectively. As in the primary setting, α proportion of consumers
knows the quality for the product carrying individual brands, that is, with nested names;
however, 1 − α consumers are unaware about the precise quality and can only infer the
quality based on their available information. We assume that the unaware consumers know
how costly it is to develop an individual brand (that is, the cost f) and that they know that
there exists α proportion of aware consumers. In this case, it is possible for the H producers
to signal their product quality with nested names. The signaling possibility lies in the fact
that the existence of aware consumers and branding cost make nested names a very costly
strategy for L quality producers. Consequently, unaware consumers know that only the H
producers can afford the use of nested names.
We use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game and restrict attention to
pure strategy equilibria. When making purchasing decisions, unaware consumers, observing
the price p and the name pattern j (j ∈ {U,N}), update their beliefs about the product
quality based on these signals. We denote by b(p, j) a consumer’s posterior belief that quality
is high, that is, equal to δ) and hence 1 − b(p, j) is the belief of the low quality (that is,
s). For simplicity, we assume that producers are charging monopolist prices to consumers.
Hence, a consumer will purchase only if the price is not higher than her expected willingness-
to-pay (WTP), that is, p ≤ E(s|b(p, j)) = b(p, j)δ+ (1− b(p, j))s. Given the belief b and the
predetermined quality standard s, a producer i (i ∈ {H,L}) chooses the labeling strategy
j and the price p to maximize her expected profit. We denote by pii(p, j; b, s) the expected
profit after the first stage quality investment.
We first investigate the separating equilibrium, where H producers choose the nested
names pattern and L producers stay with the uniform label. We then determine the pooling
equilibrium, in which both H and L producers adopt the uniform name. We show that the
conditions supporting these equilibria depend on the quality standard s, which is determined
in the first stage. Finally, we discuss the possibility that the L-majority ‘manipulates’ the
quality standard to achieve the desirable equilibrium outcome – a result which is consistent
with the basic results in the primary setting.
B.2 Separating equilibrium under the nested names pattern
At any separating equilibrium, H producers choose (pH , N) and L producers choose (pL, U).
Unaware consumer’s beliefs are given by b(pH , N) = 1 for (pH , N) and b(p
′, j) = 0 for all
(p′, j) 6= (pH , N). To find the separating equilibria, we follow Milgrom and Roberts (1986)
and focus on the equilibria for which dominated strategies are removed and the associated
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beliefs of the type playing the dominated strategies are set to zero. Thus, at any separating
equilibrium, the choice (pH , N) of a H producer must be a solution of her profit maximization
program. The maximizing program ensures that the choice of p is not dominated by other
p′ in equilibrium:
max
p
piH(p,N ; 1, s) = p− f
s.t. piL(p,N ; 1, s) = (1− α)p− f ≤ piL(pL, U ; 0, s) = s (B1)
max
p
piH(p,N ; 1, s) = p− f ≥ piH(pL, U ; 0, s) = s (B2)
0 ≤ p ≤ δ.
Condition (B1) is the incentive compatibility constraint such that a L producer do not mimic
a H producer. The left hand side corresponds to the payoff of L when choosing the nested
names pattern (with cost f) and charging a price p. Obviously, only the unaware consumers
(1−α) are willing to purchase from L if she tries to mimic H. The right hand side corresponds
to the profit that a L producer can get if she stays with the uniform name. With the existence
of individual brands, all consumers know the true quality of the products and L producers
can charge a price up to consumers’ WTP, that is, pL = s. Condition (B2) ensures that H
has no incentive to deviate from the separating equilibrium. The last condition guarantees
that consumers will purchase under the equilibrium belief b(p,N) = 1.
By solving the program, we find that the separating equilibrium, in which H chooses
(pH(s), N) and L chooses (s, U) exists if the following condition is satisfied:
s ≤ δ − f. (B3)
Then, the price for H producers pH(s) can be derived as:
pH(s) = min{δ, f + s
1− α}. (B4)
The equilibrium solution can be illustrated in Figure B1 where the range of prices at which
the separating equilibria exist are depicted in the gray area. Maximizing piH(p,N ; 1, s)
implies that all prices in the range below the kinked thick line are equilibrium-dominated by
pH(s). Note that (pH(s), N) is the unique separating equilibrium that satisfies the ‘intuitive
criterion’ of Cho and Kreps (1987) because there does not exist any other (p′, j) such that
piH(p
′, j; 1, s) > piH(pH(s), N ; 1, s) and piL(p′, j; 1, s) < piL(s, U ; 0, s). Thus, if s < δ − f ,
there exists a unique separating equilibrium that satisfies the ‘intuitive criterion’ and this
equilibrium depends on the predetermined quality standard s. In this equilibrium, H will
charge the monopolist price pH(s) = δ, when s is not too low, i.e. s > (1−α)δ−f . When the
level of the standard s is very low, L producers have more incentives to mimic H producers
at a high price than to stay with the uniform name. Therefore, the price of H has to be
reduced to f+s
1−α so that the unaware consumers believe that L producers cannot profitably
deviate by mimicking H producers.
It should be mentioned that the existence of aware consumers is a necessary condition for
the existence of separating equilibrium. Indeed, if α tends to zero, the separating equilibria
area shrinks to a single line defined by p = f +s, making both H and L producers indifferent
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between the separating equilibrium and pooling with a price equal to s. Thus, in the absence
of the aware consumers, there is no possibility for H producers to signal the high quality
with individual brands. When α becomes larger, the upper bound curve f+s
1−α shifts upward,
and it becomes then more likely that the separating equilibrium exists with H producers
charging the monopolist price δ. However, if the separating equilibrium exists, the profit of
a L producer (equal to s) does not depend on α. To this extent, the information effect under
the signaling game does not change the quality incentives of L producers in a continuous
way as it does in the primary setting.
B.3 Pooling equilibrium under the uniform name
We denote by pU the pooling price charged by both L and H producers. With the uniform
name, both the aware and unaware consumers’ beliefs follow the prior b(pU , U) = β. The
equilibrium price is equal to consumers’ WTP, that is, pU(s) = βδ + (1 − β)s. Notice that
the best a producer can gain from deviating tfrom he pooling price is by choosing the out-
of-equilibrium belief b(p,N) = 1. With such a belief, the most profitable deviation is to set
p = δ. The conditions for the existence of the pooling equilibria are thus derived as:
piL(p
U , U ; β, s) = βδ + (1− β)s ≥ piL(δ,N ; 1, s) = (1− α)δ − f, (B5)
piH(p
U , U ; β, s) = βδ + (1− β)s ≥ piH(δ,N ; 1, s) = δ − f. (B6)
The incentive compatibility constraint (B5) for producer L is less stringent than (B6) for
producer H due to the existence of aware consumers. Therefore, the condition for pooling
equilibria hinges on condition (B6) and is given by:
s ≥ δ − f
1− β . (B7)
This condition implies that the uniform name exists in equilibrium only if the predetermined
quality standard s is not too low. Similar to Lemma 1 stated in the primary setting, the
uniform name will more likely arise only if producers are not too heterogeneous, that is, if s
is not too low compared to δ.
The pooling equilibrium condition (B7) may overlap with the separate equilibrium con-
dition (B3) when
δ − f
1− β ≤ s < δ − f.
For values of s satisfying the above condition, we thus have multiple equilibria and both
pooling and separating equilibria are possible. However, conditions (B5) and (B6) imply
that the profits for both L and H producers under the pooling equilibrium are higher than
those under separating equilibrium, that is, the separating equilibrium is Pareto-dominated
by the pooling equilibrium. We thus choose the pooling equilibrium whenever multiple
equilibria appear. Lemma B1 summarizes the possible outcomes:30
30The lemma gives the pure strategy equilibrium that satisfies the ‘intuitive criterion’. There may be other
equilibria (for instance, mixed strategy equilibria) that may occur depending on the range of parameters.
Lemma B1 can be seen as the likelihood that a particular equilibrium outcome occurs.
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Lemma B1 The equilibrium of the signaling game depends on the quality standard chosen
by L producers (s):
• when s < δ − f
1−β and α > 0, there is a unique separating equilibrium (satisfying the
intuitive criterion), in which nested names pattern is adopted: H develops the individual
brands and L stays in the collective label with profit piNL (s) = s;
• when s ≥ δ − f
1−β , pooling equilibrium arises: both the H and L producers adopt the
uniform name and gain a profit piUL (s) = pi
U
H(s) = βδ + (1− β)s.
The lemma implies that given the quality standard s, the more heterogeneous producers are
(δ is large), the more likely H producers will signal their high quality with nested names.
However, the effect of consumers’ information (α) is discontinuous. In what follows, we focus
only on the effect of δ.
B.4 Quality setting
In the quality setting stage, the L-majority chooses the quality standard under a name pat-
tern j (j ∈ {U,N}) that maximizes L producers’ equilibrium profit taking into account the
quality cost. Let ΠjL maxs pi
j
L(s)−Φ(s) denote the maximum profit under a name pattern j.
Without any constraint, the equilibrium quality standards under the uniform name (that is,
pooling equilibrium) and the nested names (that is, separating equilibrium) are respectively
defined by (1 − β) = Φ′(sU) and sN = s∗. It is straightforward to show that sU < sN = s∗
and ΠUL > Π
N
L , implying that without any constraint the L producers strictly prefer the
uniform name to the nested names pattern because of the spillover effect under the uniform
name. Therefore, if H producers want to signal their quality with individual brands because
sU is low, that is, sU < δ − f
1−β (Lemma B1), the L group will increase the standard to
s = sˆU = δ − f
1−β in order to achieve the pooling equilibrium outcome. We are thus in the
constrained uniform name case (CU) as is studied in Lemma 2 of the primary setting.
Again, whether the L-majority will adjust the quality standard to induce the uncon-
strained uniform name (U), the constrained one (CU) or the nested names pattern (N),
depends on the range of parameters. In particular, it depends on the heterogeneity among
producers, which is captured by δ. These results are similar to those seen in Proposition 1
of the primary setting of the main text.
Proposition B1 Under the signaling game, the L-majority faces a trade-off between choos-
ing a high standard to induce the uniform name pattern (pooling equilibrium) or a low stan-
dard to induce the nested names pattern (separating equilibrium). There exists δˆ = f
1−β + s
U
and δNU solving ΠNL = Πˆ
U
L ≡ piUL (sˆU)− Φ(sˆU) such that δˆ < δNU and
• if δ < δˆ, the L group chooses s = sU , leading to the uniform name;
• if δˆ ≤ δ < δNU , the L group chooses s = sˆU with sˆU > sU , leading to the uniform
name;
• if δ ≥ δNU , the L group chooses s = sN with sN = s∗ < sˆU . H producers develop
individual brands, leading to nested names.
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Proof The first item of the proposition is straightforward from Lemma B1, which implies
that the pooling equilibrium exists if the quality standard sU is such that sU > δ+ f
1−β . This
leads to the condition δ < δˆ = f
1−β + s
U and the equilibrium profit ΠUL = pi
U
L (s
U) − Φ(sU),
which is larger than ΠNL . When δ > δˆ, s
U < sˆU and the L-majority has to raise the
quality standard to sˆU in order to implement the uniform name. It is easily derived that
∂ΠˆUL
∂δ
|sˆU=sU > 0, ∂Πˆ
U
L
∂δ
|sˆU=s∗ = 0 and ∂
2ΠˆUL
∂δ2
< 0. Therefore, ΠˆUL is concave in δ and reaches
its maximum when sˆU = s∗, i.e., δ = f
1−β + s
∗. When δ > f
1−β + s
∗, ΠˆUL decreases at an
increasing rate. However ΠNL = s
∗−Φ(s∗) does not change with a change of δ. By continuity,
there exists δNU solving ΠNL = Πˆ
U
L , such that Π
N
L ≥ ΠˆUL if and only if δ ≤ δNU . In this case,
the nested names pattern is preferred by the L-majority, and hence the quality standard is
set at s∗ to implement the separating equilibrium. If δ < δNU , the pooling equilibrium is
still preferred by the L-majority. In this case, a higher quality standard sˆU > s∗ is chosen
to implement the uniform name. Q.E.D.
Therefore, we obtain results similar to those in the primary setting: nested names arise
when the producer heterogeneity is high enough. Moreover, whenever the nested names
pattern is chosen to replace the uniform name, it leads to lower quality incentives for the
L producers. From a welfare point of view, nested names under the signaling game are
socially optimal because they result in the first-best quality levels. The uniform name, on
the other hand, is suboptimal because it may result in either under-provision (in the case of
unconstrained uniform name) or over-provision (in the case of constrained uniform name) of
quality.
C Consumers with heterogeneous tastes and competi-
tion
We investigate now a framework where producers with different qualities compete for
consumers with different preferences over quality. This framework corresponds to the case
where numerous producers within a region compete perfectly (hence, act as price-takers)
in a vertically differentiated market (see, e.g., Moschini et al., 2008). In this section, we
show that our two main results 1) and 2) still hold as long as producers can capture positive
quality premium, even if the premium is small under competition.
C.1 Consumers with heterogeneous tastes and perfect competi-
tion
Consumer heterogeneity Consider a market with a mass m of consumers who are het-
erogeneous both in their tastes and in their information about qualities. The utility function
is captured by U(s, p) = θs − p, where θ is the consumers’ taste parameter uniformly dis-
tributed in [0, 1].
Producers with quantity decisions There are n producers, competing in offering prod-
ucts with different qualities. We denote by ρ = n
m
the competition intensity. We assume
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that ρ is low enough so that the market is uncovered by the group of producers. Because of
the geographical area constraint, we assume no free-entry of producers in the area.31
For simplicity, we assume that both the H and L producers have the same production
costs c(q) but producer L incur a fixed-quality dependent cost, Φ(s) in order to achieve the
standard level s. The H producer, however, can provide quality δ without cost. To ensure
an interior solution, we assume quadratic cost functions: the total costs born by producer
L and H are CL(q, s) = c(q) + Φ(s) =
λ
2
q2 + γ
2
s2 and CH(q, δ) = c(q) =
λ
2
q2, respectively.
We also assume that s < δ, implying that γ is large enough so that L producers never find
optimal to provide the quality level δ.
The game Compared to the primary setting, we introduce a quantity decision in the
final stage of the game: In stage 1, the L majority decides the quality standard for the
collective label. In stage 2, producers decide whether to adopt only the collective label, or
develop their individual brands, nested or separate with the collective label. The L producers
incur a quality cost Φ(s) = γ
2
s2 if joining the collective label, and H pays f if developing
the individual brands. These costs are sunk at this stage and will not affect the following
decision of producers. The name patten is formed following the labeling decision. In stage
3, given the quality standard and the name pattern, demand is formed. Producers decide
quantity. Market is cleared with demand equal to supply.
The game is solved with backward induction. At the last stage, producers behave as price-
takers so that their marginal cost of quantity c′(q) = λq is equal to the market price, which
depends on the demand under different names. As in the previous setting, we investigate
three name patterns: the uniform name (‘U’), nested names (‘N’) and separate names (‘S’),
which convey different information to consumers about the product quality. We assume that
consumers’ perception of quality under different names is the same as that stated in Table
1. Such a simplification implies that the unaware consumers are naive and only perceive the
average quality (s¯ = βδ + (1 − β)s) based on the prior distribution of H and L producers
under the collective label. That is, they do not update their beliefs about the product quality
based on the anticipation of the producers’ quantity decision. A more sophisticated behavior
of consumers is discussed in subsection C.2, where consumers perceive s¯ = δQH+sQL
QH+QL
, with
Qi (i ∈ {H,L}) being the total quantity supplied by producers i.
The uniform name (‘U’) Under this name pattern, both aware and unaware consumers
consider producers as homogeneous. Given the perceived quality s¯ = βδ + (1− β)s and the
market price p, the indifferent consumer is defined by θs¯ − p = 0, so that consumers with
taste θ ∈ [p
s¯
, 1] will purchase the product. By symmetry, we have QL = n(1 − β)qL and
31Introducing free-entry may lead to different results, depending on the timing of entry. In Moschini
et al. (2008), free entry drives the profit to zero for producers with exogenous qualities. This means that
producers would have no incentive to provide costly quality if the quality decision took place before the entry
decision. In a more standard vertical differentiation model (Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Roe and Sheldon, 2007,
etc.), entry occurs before the quality decision and price competition implies that only a limited number of
producers with positive profits remain in the market. In this case, label plays a role to restore the market
power of producers under harsh competition and only the separate names pattern exists in equilibrium. We
investigate this situation in subsection C.3.
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QH = nβqH . The inverse demand function under the uniform name pattern is derived as:
pU = s¯(1− QL +QH
m
) = s¯ (1− ρ(βqH + (1− β)qL)) .
Thus, under the uniform name, the spillover effects reflected in s¯, still exist in the competitive
market, even if their effect is weakened by the competition among H and L producers (∂
2pU
∂s¯∂ρ
<
0). Because both H and L producers face the same demand and have the same cost of
production (c(q) = λ
2
q2), they will supply the same quantity in equilibrium. The equilibrium
quantity qU(s) is defined by:
pU = s¯(1− ρqU) = c′ = λqU .
The nested names pattern (‘N’) Under this name pattern, the market is segmented
into the aware and unaware markets, with sizes αm and (1 − α)m, respectively. In the
unaware market, the demand faced by both H and L producers are similar to the case of the
uniform name, except that the market is smaller. We denote by qui the quantity supplied
by a producer i (i ∈ {H,L}) in the unaware market. The inverse demand function is then
given by:
pN(u) = s¯
(
1− Q
u
L +Q
u
H
(1− α)m
)
= s¯
(
1− ρ
1− α(βq
u
H + (1− β)quL)
)
.
Again, the spillover effecst still exist in the unaware market, and their effect is smaller the
more intensive the competition is (larger ρ) and the smaller the relative size of the unaware
market (1− α).
In the aware market, the two qualities (s and δ) are identified by consumers. Denote by
p
N(a)
L and p
N(a)
H the market prices for the two qualities. Following Mussa and Rosen (1978),
consumers with taste ranging in [
p
N(a)
H −p
N(a)
L
δ−s , 1] will purchase from producers H, and those
with tastes in [
p
N(a)
L
s
,
p
N(a)
H −p
N(a)
L
δ−s ] will buy from producers L. Denoting by q
a
i the quantity
supplied by a producer i in the aware market, following Moschini et al. (2008), we derive the
inverse demand function as:
p
N(a)
H = δ −
ρ
α
(δβqaH + s(1− β)qaL), (C1)
p
N(a)
L = s(1−
ρ
α
(βqaH + (1− β)qaL)). (C2)
Thus, there are no spillover effects in the aware market. A producer L enjoys the price
premium of quality s, which is reduced if the producers face intensive competition in a small
market (that is, for large values of ρ and small values of α).
The inverse demand functions imply that under the nested names pattern each producer
is facing a segmented demand in the aware and unaware markets. Under perfect competition,
the quantity allocation should be such that producers will leave the market with lower price
or produce until the two market prices are equalized. It can be shown that when the quality
standard is not too high (or when the quality cost is not too small, that is, γ is large
enough), market prices are ranked as in the following: p
N(a)
L < p
N(u) < p
N(a)
H . It follows that
L producers will only supply the unaware market (qaL = 0) and H producers will only supply
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the aware market (quH = 0).
32 The equilibrium quantities qNL (s) and q
N
H (s) are defined by the
following conditions:
pN(u) = s¯
(
1− ρ
1− α(1− β)q
u
L
)
= λquL, (C3)
p
N(a)
H = δ(1−
ρ
α
βqaH) = λq
a
H . (C4)
The separate names pattern (‘S’) Under this name pattern, unaware consumers can
identify the L producers’ true quality s, which is also the average quality of the L group.
However, without the collective label, unaware consumers cannot identify the individual
name of H producers and perceive only the minimum quality in the spot market (s0 with
s0 < s). Denoting respectively by p
S(u)
L and p
S(u)
H the market prices for L producers with
quality s and for H producers with perceived quality s0, the inverse demand functions in the
unaware market (with market size (1− α)m) are then given by:
p
S(u)
L = s−
ρ
1− α(s(1− β)q
u
L + s0βq
u
H), (C5)
p
S(u)
H = s0(1−
ρ
1− α(βq
u
H + (1− β)quL)). (C6)
For the aware consumers (with market size αm), the two qualities δ and s are perfectly
identified. We are thus in the same situation as in the aware market under the nested names
pattern. The inverse demand p
S(a)
H and p
S(a)
L are of the same form as defined in conditions
(C1) and (C2), respectively.
Again, each producer faces different demands in the aware and unaware markets. If the
quality cost is not too small, the market price can be ranked, that is, p
S(a)
H > p
S(u)
L > p
S(a)
L >
p
S(u)
H . L producers will only target the unaware market (q
a
L = 0), while H producers, facing a
low demand in the unaware market, will leave this market, that is, quH = 0. The equilibrium
quantities qSL(s) and q
S
H(s) are defined in the following conditions:
p
S(a)
H = δ(1− ραβqaH) = λqaH , (C7)
p
S(u)
L = s(1− ρ1−α(1− β)quL) = λquL. (C8)
The inverse demand and equilibrium quantities under the three name patterns are derived
in table C1.
32It can be shown that when γ is small so that the equilibrium quality standard sN is high, two cases
may occur depending on the relative size of the aware market: when the aware market is small (α < β),
producers H can supply both the aware and unaware markets (quH > 0). This is the case when s
N is above
a threshold level (sN > s1 where s1 ∈ (0, δ) is a function of parameters) so that pN(u) = pN(a)H . On the
other hand, when the aware market is large (α > β), L producers may have incentives to supply the aware
market (qaL > 0). This is the case when s
N > s2 (where s2 ∈ (0, δ) is a function of parameters), leading to
p
N(a)
L = p
N(u). Analyzing these cases involve more complex calculations but the basic results will not change
qualitatively. In the following analysis, we assume that the quality cost parameter γ is large enough so that
the equilibrium quality sN does not surpass the threshold levels.
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Table C1: Demand and equilibrium quantities under different name patterns
Name Labels Market covered Demand Equilibrium quantities
U
L: C Both aware and
unaware markets
pU = s¯(1− ρqU) qUL (s) = qUH = s¯ρs¯+λH: C
N
L:C Only unaware mar-
ket
pN(u) = s¯
(
1− ρ
1−α(1− β)quL
)
qNL (s) =
(1−α)s¯
ρ(1−β)s¯+(1−α)λ
H:
C + I
Only aware market p
N(a)
H = δ(1− ραβqaH) qNH (s) = αδρβδ+αλ
S
L:C Only unaware mar-
ket
p
S(u)
L = s
(
1− ρ
1−α(1− β)quL
)
qSL(s) =
(1−α)s
ρ(1−β)s+(1−α)λ
H: I Only aware market p
S(a)
H = δ(1− ραβqaH) qSH(s) = αδρβδ+αλ
Labeling choice Given the quality standard s, producers choose the label that gives the
highest profits. We denote by piji (s) the third stage (post quality investment) profit of a
producer i under a name pattern j (j ∈ {U,N, S}). In equilibrium, pji = c′(qji ) = λqji and
hence,
piji (s) = p
j
iq
j
i − c(qji ) =
λ
2
qji
2
.
The third stage profit is thus monotonically determined by the equilibrium quantity, which is
derived in the last column of table C1. Investigating the equilibrium quantities leads to three
observations. First, qNL > q
S
L, implying that L producers strictly prefer the nested names
pattern to the separate names pattern due to the spillover effects that arise under nested
names (from table C1, pN(u) > pS(u) for given quantity quL). Second, while the uniform name
is always preferred by the L producers in the primary setting, now nested names may be
preferred by them. It is easily checked that when α < β, then qNL > q
U
L and hence pi
N
L > pi
U
L .
Indeed, in the presence of producer competition, nested names have an advantage for the
L producers: compared to the uniform name where all producers compete, nested names
enable L producers to operate in the segmented (unaware) market without competing with
the H producers. The larger the proportion of unaware consumers relative to the number
of L producers, the more beneficial it is for the L producers to adopt nested names. Third,
the quantities for H, qNH and q
S
H , are the same and independent of s if H producers develop
their individual brands. Therefore, the labeling choice of H producers can be derived by
the comparison between the profits obtained under ‘U’ and ‘N’. Again, since qUH and pi
U
H are
strictly increasing in s, it is more likely for H producers to adopt the name pattern ‘U’ when
s is high. The above analysis can be summarized in Lemma C1.
Lemma C1 When producers compete for consumers with heterogeneous tastes, for a given
quality standard s,
• L producers prefer the uniform name only if α > β;
• H producers prefer the uniform name only if s ≥ sˆU , where sˆU solves λ
2
qU(s)
2
=
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λ
2
qNH
2 − f , that is, the participation constraint for H to adopt the uniform name is
λ
2
(
s¯
ρs¯+ λ
)2
≥ λ
2
(
αδ
ρβδ + αλ
)2
− f. (C9)
Lemma C1 is similar to Lemma 1 in the primary setting. Notice that the participation
constraint for H holds for small α and large f ; however, the effects of δ is less straightforward.
On one hand, δ increases the conflicts inside the uniform group, which gives H producers
incentives to deviate and develop individual brands. On the other hand, a large δ stimulates
the production of H producers inside the uniform group, and may eventually lead to a
higher profit for H producers than the profits they would have gained in the ”narrow” aware
market. The ultimate effects of δ are thus ambiguous. Indeed, when L and H compete
in quantities, the quantity difference implies that δ is no longer a pertinent measure for
producer heterogeneity. In what follows, we focus on the effect of α and f . Moreover, we
first investigate the case where α > β, so that L producers prefer the uniform name for a
given standard, as we did in the primary setting. Other parameter ranges will be discussed
after deriving the main results.
Quality setting When α > β, the L-majority wants to implement the uniform name by
setting the quality, taking into account the participation constraint of H producers. Let
ΠjL(s) = pi
j
L(s) − Φ(s) be the (first-stage) net profit of producer L under the name pattern
j. The problem for the L-majority can be written as:33
max
s
ΠUL(s) = pi
U
L (s)− Φ(s)
s.t. condition (C9).
By solving the problem, we derive the following lemma:
Lemma C2 When producers compete for consumers with heterogeneous tastes, in order to
implement the uniform name, the L-majority chooses standard sU , which solves
∂piUL
∂s
= λqU
∂qU
∂s
= Φ′(s)
if and only if α < αˆ, where αˆ solves λ
2
(
βδ+(1−β)sU
ρ(βδ+(1−β)sU )+λ
)2
= λ
2
(
αδ
ρβδ+αλ
)2
− f . Otherwise, it
will chooses sˆU with sˆU > sU to make condition (C9) binding.
33The H producer’s outside option can be interpreted as the single deviation profit of producer H when
developing the individual brand to attract the aware consumers. Since producers are small and the market
size is large, it is reasonable to assume that the deviating producer H serves only for 1βn part of the aware
market. The inverse demand function is thus δ(1 − ρβqaHα ), which is similar to pS(a)H defined in Table C1.
Thus, the deviating producer H behaves as if she competes in the aware market with the separate names
pattern. The equilibrium quantity is thus qSH . So the outside option condition becomes
λ
2 q
U (s)
2 ≥ λ2 qSH
2−f ,
which is the same as condition (C9).
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Lemma C2 is similar to Lemma 2 in the primary setting, except that the outside option
condition should be interpreted from the consumers’ information perspective. Indeed, when
consumers become more aware, the threat from the high-quality producers to develop their
own brand makes the L group increase their quality standard so as to keep producers H in the
uniform label. This leads to the constrained uniform case (‘CU’) with the quality standard
being set at a high level. Again, nested names may be chosen to replace the uniform name
when the L group cannot sustain the high quality standard. Proposition C1 shows that for
a large range of parameters the main results still hold.34
Proposition C1 When producers compete for consumers with heterogeneous tastes, there
exist αNU , which solves ΠUL(sˆ
U) = ΠNL (s
N), such that if f > fˆ ≡ λ
2
(
δ
ρδ+λ
)2
−λ
2
(
βδ+(1−β)sU
ρ(βδ+(1−β)sU )+λ
)2
,
then αNU > αˆ > β and
• if α ≤ αˆ, the L-majority chooses standard sU , leading to the uniform name pattern
‘U’;
• if αˆ < α ≤ αNU , the L-majority chooses standard sˆU , with sˆU > sU , leading to the
constrained uniform name pattern ‘CU’;
• if α > αNU , the L-majority chooses sN , with sN < sˆU , leading to the nested names
pattern ‘N’.
Proof: The first item is directly derived from Lemma C2. For the second and third items
we need to look at αNU , which is defined as αNU = {α|ΠUL(sˆU)− ΠNL (sN) = 0}. First, note
that when α is very high, the condition (C9) is binding and sˆU becomes increasing with α.
Then, we can have:
∂ΠUL(sˆ
U)− ΠNL (sN)
∂α
< 0, (C10)
implying that when α > (or≤) αNU , ΠUL(sˆU) < (or≥) ΠNL (sN), so that the L producers prefer
nested names (or the ‘CU’). The equilibrium name depends on the comparison of αˆ and αNU .
Second, note that the two thresholds are functions of f . We have ∂αˆ
∂f
= 1/
(
−∂piNH
∂α
)
> 0 and
∂αNU
∂f
= 1/
(
−∂piNH
∂α
− ∂piNL
∂α
∂piU
∂s
/
∂ΠUL
∂s
|s=sˆU
)
> 0, where
∂piNH
∂α
= λqNH
∂qNH
∂α
> 0,
∂piNL
∂α
= λqNL
∂qNL
∂α
< 0,
∂piU
∂s
= λqU ∂q
U
∂s
> 0 and
∂ΠUL
∂s
|s=sˆU = λqU(sU)∂qU∂s − Φ′(sˆU) < 0 for sˆU > sU . Therefore, we
have:
∂αNU
∂f
>
∂αˆ
∂f
> 0. (C11)
Notice that αˆ and αNU may intersect for some values of f . Denoting by fˆ = {f |αˆ = αNU},
then at f = fˆ we have α = αˆ = αNU . From the definition of αˆ and αNU , we have
sU = sˆU , and thus ΠUL(s
U) = ΠNL (s
N). Note that sU = arg max ΠUL(s) =
λ
2
qU(s) − Φ(s),
34It should be noted that when α < β, nested names are preferred by the L group. However, in the case
that α < αˆ, H producers are better off under the uniform name. Anticipating this, the L group has to
reduce the quality at the level sˆN , with sˆN < sN , to prevent the H producers from competing in the unaware
market. However, by doing so, it can be proved that piNL (sˆ
N ) < piUL , such that the uniform name is chosen
in equilibrium.
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sN = arg max ΠNL (s) =
λ
2
qNL (s) − Φ(s). In order to have ΠUL(sU) = ΠNL (sN), we must
have qU(s) = qNL (s). From Table C1, q
U(s) = qNL (s) if α = β and hence we derive
fˆ = piNH − piU(sU)|α=β = λ2
(
δ
ρδ+λ
)2
− λ
2
(
βδ+(1−β)sU
ρ(βδ+(1−β)sU )+λ
)2
. At this point, αˆ = αNU = β.
When f > fˆ , both αˆ and αNU increase with f but αNU increases more from condition
(C11). Therefore, we have αNU > αˆ > β when f > fˆ . From Lemma C2 and condition
(C10), we have the second and third items of the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proposition C1 is similar to Proposition 1 in the primary setting, except that the results
are derived from the perspective of the consumers’ awareness. Thus in the presence of
producer competition and consumer heterogeneous tastes, the results are similar to the
main results 1 and 2: the nested names pattern is chosen if a larger proportion of consumers
become more aware, and whenever it arises in place of the uniform name pattern the quality
for the majority of L producers is reduced.
As an illustration, we can draw the equilibrium name pattern in the α−f space. For the
ease of presentation, we represent the threshold conditions on f which are functions of α.
Let FˆU(α) = {f : ΠUH(sU) = ΠUH} and FNU(α) = {f : ΠUL(sˆU) = ΠNL }, FˆN(α) = {f : ΠNH =
ΠNL (s
N)} and FUN(α) = {f : ΠUL(sU) = ΠNL (sˆN)}. The equilibrium name patterns can be
plotted in Figure C1. The figure shows that the α − f space is divided into four regions.
In the upper-left grey area, where the size of the aware market is small and the cost of H
to develop individual brand is large, the uniform name is chosen without any constraint. In
the lower-right grey area, with more information and lower costs to develop the individual
brand, nested names are chosen without any constraint. However, in the intermediate range,
if f > fˆ , the L group has to increase the quality standard to (α) in order to keep H producers
inside the uniform name.
Discussion about other parameter ranges It should be noted that similar results still
hold if f is low, that is, if f ≤ fˆ . In this case, nested names are more likely to be chosen in
equilibrium. In particular, when α > β it is impossible for the L group to raise s and have
the H producers to accept the uniform name, even if the uniform name gives L producers
higher profit. When α < β, L producers prefer the nested names pattern (qU < qNL so that
piU < piNL ). However, when α becomes small (α < αˆ
N with αˆN making H indifferent between
targeting only the aware market and competing with L producers in the unaware market), H
producers may have incentives to serve the unaware market instead of developing their costly
individual brands. To prevent the H producers from competing in the unaware market, the
L group may choose a lower quality standard than the optimal level (sˆN < sN), that is,
the L group chooses the nested names pattern under the constraint that H producers will
not target the unaware market. If α becomes very small (α < αUN , with αUN such that
L producers are indifferent between the nested names pattern with constrained low quality
standard sˆN and the unconstrained uniform name), the constrained quality standard sˆN will
be so low that the profit for the L producers under the nested names pattern is lower than
under the uniform name. Therefore, the uniform name will be chosen for a small size of the
aware market.
To conclude, we have the same result pattern as the one stated in proposition C1: if
f < fˆ , there exists αˆN and αUN such that αUN < αˆN < β; in addition, if 1) α < αUN , the
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uniform name pattern is chosen with quality standard sU ; 2) if αUN < α < αˆN , the nested
names pattern is chosen with a lower standard sˆN < sU ; 3) if α > αˆN , the nested names
pattern is chosen with quality standard sN . Again, nested names are chosen when consumers
become more aware, and whenever they are chosen in place of the uniform name, they lead
to a drop in the level of quality standard.
Effect of competition It should be noted that although the threshold αˆ and αNU are
functions of the competition intensity parameter ρ, the comparison of the threshold values is
not affected by ρ. Therefore, our results derived in proposition C1 hold for a wide range of ρ.
In fact, the effect of ρ is ambiguous. From the participation constraint (C9), ρ simultaneously
reduces the profit of H inside the uniform name and outside the collective label. Therefore, it
is difficult to derive a monotonic impact of ρ. The effect can be illustrated from a simulation
(cf. Figure C2). The changes of equilibrium variables when competition is less intensive
(ρ = 0.1 implying that the market size m is ten times larger than the number of producers
n) is represented on the left panel while the right panel represents the outcome with a
more intensive competition (ρ = 1.0). Both figures still show a discontinuous change in the
equilibrium quality for the majority group. The difference is that the constrained uniform
case ‘CU’ becomes less likely when competition is more intense.
The competition intensity may lead to different welfare impact compared to the primary
setting. We focus on the comparison of welfare under the uniform and nested names. Under
the uniform name, among all the units QU = nqU purchased, there is a proportion β of high
quality good units (with quality δ) and a proportion (1− β) of low quality good units (with
quality sU or sˆU depending on the size of the aware market α) purchased by consumers with
mass m and with tastes ranging in [p
U
s¯
, 1]. The purchasing price is pU = pU(qU). The welfare
can thus be derived as:
WU = m
(
β
∫ 1
pU
s¯
δθdθ + (1− β)
∫ 1
pU
s¯
sθdθ
)
− n (c(qu) + (1− β)Φ(s))
= m
(∫ 1
pU
s¯
s¯θdθ − ρ
(
λ
2
qU
2
+ (1− β)γ
2
sU
2
))
. (C12)
Under nested names, consumers are segmented according to the information they have.
In the aware market (with size mα), consumers ranging in [
p
N(a)
H
δ
, 1] purchase nβqNH units of
high quality goods at price p
N(a)
H ; in the unaware market (size m(1−α)), consumers ranging
in [p
N(u)
s¯
, 1] purchase n(1− β)qNL units of low quality goods (with quality sN) at price pN(u).
The welfare function WN is thus derived as:
WN = m
(
α
∫ 1
p
N(a)
H
δ
δθdθ + (1− α)
∫ 1
p
N(u)
L
s¯
sθdθ
)
−mρ
(
β(
λ
2
qNH
2
+ f) + (1− β)(λ
2
qNL
2
+
γ
2
sN
2
)
)
(C13)
The comparison of welfare under the two name patterns is ambiguous. As can be seen from
Figure C2, the welfare change still follows the same pattern as in the primary setting when
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the competition is less intense (the left panel where ρ = 0.1). Again, whenever the nested
names pattern is chosen to replace the uniform name, we observe a reduction in the welfare
because of a lower quality standard and less quantity to be produced under the nested names
pattern. However, when competition becomes intense (the right panel where ρ = 1), nested
names lead to a higher welfare than the uniform name. One explanation is the quantity effect:
under quantity competition, the nested names pattern enables H producers to operate in the
aware market with higher WTP, and hence induces H producers to supply more quantity
than L producers. Moreover, the difference in quantity becomes larger when competition
becomes more intense. The welfare benefit from larger supplied quantity of high quality may
mitigate the negative impact of the nested names pattern on L producers’ quality choice,
leading to an increase in welfare when nested names emerge. The intuition is clearer if we
investigate the average quality s˜ = δQH+sQL
QH+QL
. As can be seen from Figure C2, the left bottom
subfigure implies that the average quality under the nested names pattern is below that
emerging with the constrained uniform name, that is, s˜N < ˆ˜sU when α > αNU . However the
relationship is reversed when competition is more intense (the right bottom figure), leading
to higher welfare under nested names in this case.
C.2 Sophisticated consumers perceiving s˜ = δQH+sQLQH+QL
The above analysis assumes that the unaware consumers are naive, that is, their perception
about the average quality of the collective label will not be adjusted based on the quantities
purchased. In this subsection, we consider consumers’ quality perception described in Table
1 but now assume that the unaware consumers know the production technology of L and
H producers and can thus update their perception of the average quality based on their
anticipation of the equilibrium quantities supplied by H and L producers. Thus, we follow
Zago and Pick (2004) and assume that the average quality of the collective label perceived
by the unaware consumers is s˜ = δQH+sQL
QH+QL
.
The uniform name pattern (‘U’) results in the same equilibrium quantities qU and the
same profits piUL = pi
U
H =
λ
2
(qU(sU))2 as we derived in the last section of naive consumer
case, because sophisticated consumers should anticipate that L and H producers produce
the same quantity (qL = qH) and hence the average quality of the uniform name is still
given by s˜ = s¯ = βδ + (1 − β)s. The separate names pattern (‘S’) also results in the same
equilibrium, since the unaware consumers are perfectly informed about the true quality of
the product.
However, the perceptions of naive and sophisticated consumers may differ in the case of
nested names (‘N’), where the demand in the unaware market becomes
pN(u) = s˜
(
1− ρ
1− α(βq
u
H + (1− β)quL)
)
.
However, if we assume that the quality cost (γ) is large, the ranking in market prices will still
be p
N(a)
L < p
N(u) < p
N(a)
H , such that H producers will only target the aware market.
35 With
this assumption, we have s˜ = s. The spillover effect vanishes and hence the nested names
35Again, this requires the equilibrium quality level to be sN < s1, with s1, such that the prices in the
aware and unaware markets are equalized, that is, pN(u) = p
N(a)
H .
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outcome becomes the same as that of the separate names pattern, with the equilibrium
quantities being defined in condition (C7) and (C8). Therefore, the equilibrium quality
standard is sN = sS, which gives ΠNL = Π
S
L = maxs pi
S
L(s)−Φ(s) and ΠNH = ΠSH = λ2qSH
2 − f .
Again, under the uniform name, H producers may have incentives to deviate and develop
their individual brand if more consumers become aware α > αˆ. The argument is exactly
the same as that in Lemma C2 and results similar to those in Proposition C1 still hold,
except that the threshold parameter αNU now becomes αSU (with αSU > αNU), which solves
ΠUL(sˆ
U) = ΠSL. Therefore, our main results 1) and 2) still hold when the unaware consumers
are sophisticated.
C.3 Heterogeneous consumers and price competition
In this section, we follow Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Roe and Sheldon (2007) to investi-
gate a framework where producers compete in price in a vertically differentiated market.36
Consumers’ preferences are unchanged and described as in the subsection C.1. Roe and
Sheldon (2007) show that if consumers’ taste is not too dispersed and the qualities are per-
fectly perceived by consumers, the market will be covered so that all consumers are served
and only two firms can survive on the market. In this spirit, we depart from the former
assumption of a large mass of producers but consider only two producers representing the
H and the L types, respectively.37 Furthermore, we assume zero production costs for both
H and L firms. We also assume that the L firm incurs a fixed quality cost Φ(s), which is
sunk before the price competition stage.38 The game still follows the three stages described
in subsection C.1, except that in the third stage, L and H producers compete in price.
Uniform name With the uniform label, the two varieties H and L are seen as identical by
both aware and unaware consumers. The average quality is equal to s¯. The two producers
play a standard Bertrand game with homogeneous products, such that prices are set at (zero)
marginal cost level in equilibrium and both producers gain zero profits. Thus, in the quality
setting stage, the L producers have no incentives to provide quality and soquality is set at
the minimum quality level sU = s0.
Nested names Under this name pattern, the unaware consumers still consider the two
producers as homogeneous, leading to zero profits for both producers in the unaware market.
However, aware consumers can fully identify the quality with nested individual brands.
Denoting by ph, pl the prices chosen by H and L producers in the aware market, respectively,
36A well-recognized result of the model with vertical differentiation is that price competition leads to a
concentrated industry so that there are only a limited number of producers existing in the market (Shaked and
Sutton, 1982).Therefore, we simply consider a duopolistic competition model to investigate the concentrated
industry.
37To endogenize the number of firms, we can followRoe and Sheldon (2007) and add an entry stage before
the quality setting stage. When consumers’ preferences are not too dispersed, two qualities will remain,
resulting in the competition of a firm H providing a quality δ, and a firm L providing a quality s (s ≥ s0).
38As is argued by Roe and Sheldon (2007), “the assumption of zero variable production costs can be
relaxed if we assume that variable production costs do not increase in quality more than consumer WTP
increases in quality.”
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the duopoly profits for the two producers in the aware market(with size αm) are then derived
as:
piL(pL, pH , s) = αm
(
pH − pL
δ − s
)
pL, (C14)
piH(pL, pH , s) = αm
(
1− pH − pL
δ − s
)
pH . (C15)
The game is solved backward. The detailed calculation is derived in Roe and Sheldon
(2007). Denote by piNi (s) the equilibrium profits for the producer i (i ∈ {H,L}) in the price
competition stage. The equilibrium quality standard sN and profits for producer L are thus
defined by ΠNL = maxs pi
N
L (s) − Φ(s). The profits for producer H are ΠNH = piNH (sN) − f . It
is easy to check that
∂ΠNi
∂α
> 0.
Separate names When the two producers adopt different labels, both the aware and
unaware consumers can fully identify the true qualities of the products. Thus, the unaware
consumers see the products like the aware ones. The market is fully segmented such that
producers L and H can exploit their duopoly power in the whole market. That is, producer
i, facing the market with size m, gains the duopolistic profit ΠSi = Π
N
i |α=1. The profit is
clearly larger than what i can gain under nested names (with market size αm).
The equilibrium name patterns depend on the profit comparison of the L producer under
the three name patterns. The above analysis implies that ΠSi > Π
N
i > Π
U
i = 0. Thus we
obtain:
Proposition C2 If producers compete in price and consumers have heterogeneous tastes,
the spillover effects of collective label vanish so that producers strictly prefer the separate
names pattern.
This result is different from the results found in the primary setting. It is mainly due to
the fact that the spillover effects vanish if firms compete intensively. Adding restrictions
to competition may restore the spillover effects. For instance, by restricting supply when
producers face increasing marginal costs, as shown in Subsection C.1. Another instance could
be when producers have market power and can charge a price in reaction to the demand
condition, that is, the case analyzed in the primary setting.
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Figure 3: Producer heterogeneity, consumer information and equilibrium name
The left panel of the figure shows the change of variables with the producer heterogeneity δ when we fix
the level of α (which corresponds to the vertical line α = 0.5 in Figure 2) and the right panel captures the
effect of consumer awareness α when we fix the level of δ (which corresponds to the horizontal line δ = 2.0
in figure 2). The dark and thick curve in each sub-figure represents the equilibrium variables, which change
with the parameters and the equilibrium name patterns.52
Figure A1: Equilibrium name patterns without PD
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Figure A2: Equilibrium variables without PD
54
Figure B1: Separating equilibrium
Figure C1: Equilibrium name patterns (δ = 10.0, β = 0.33, ρ = 0.1, λ = 1.0, γ = 0.5)
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Figure C2: Change of equilibrium variables δ = 10.0, β = 0.33, λ = 1.0, γ = 0.5
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